

**T.C.**  
**ANTALYA BILIM UNIVERSITY**  
**INSTITUTE OF POSTGRADE EDUCATION**

**GLOBAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**MASTER'S THESIS**

**UNDERSTANDING HOW THE BOND BETWEEN THE POPULIST LEADER  
AND “THE PEOPLE” IS FORMED: HUGO CHÁVEZ AND DONALD  
TRUMPCASES**

**Miguel Alberto BERVIS CANELON**

**JANUARY 2023**

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## **DECLARATION**

The Master Thesis of this study named “UNDERSTANDING HOW THE BOND BETWEEN THE POPULIST LEADER AND ‘THE PEOPLE’ IS FORMED: HUGO CHÁVEZ AND DONALD TRUMP CASES,” which I presented and declare that scientific moral principles were followed in the preparation of this study, in case of benefiting from the works of others, reference is made in accordance with scientific norms, no falsification has been made in the data used, and that any part of this study is not presented as another academic study.

24 /01/ 2023

Miguel Alberto Bervis Canelon

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **UNDERSTANDING HOW THE BOND BETWEEN THE POPULIST LEADER AND “THE PEOPLE” IS FORMED: HUGO CHÁVEZ AND DONALD TRUMP CASES**

**Miguel AlbertoBERVIS CANELON**

**MA Thesis in Global Politics and International Relations**

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This thesis questions the formation of the bond between the populist leader and his/her followers. This relationship is key for understanding the populist phenomenon. Until now, studies have mostly addressed populist leader’s charisma as an explanation for his/her appeal to the people. The present study employs a selection of election campaign speeches from two of the most controversial populist figures of recent times, Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump, and it focuses on the populists’ construction of the leader-people bond. For this purpose, the study utilizes directed content analysis method. The findings point out five mechanisms which are incorporated into populist leaders’ narrative, and which are used to create the leader-people bond. These are: self-construction as “the leader,” the non-verbal communication, the construction of the concept of “the people”, the identification of a crisis and the people’s mobilization. The study concludes by arguing that the leader-people bond is constructed with these mechanisms, yet the weight of these mechanisms changes from one political/cultural context to another. Also, the strength of this bond depends on the people’ effective engagement with these mechanisms.

**KEYWORDS:**populism, leader-peoplebond, charisma, populist leadership, content analysis, Hugo Chávez, Donald Trump

**COMMITTEE:** Assoc.Prof. Dr.Işıl Cerem CENKER ÖZEK

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## ÖZET

### POPÜLİST LİDER VE HALK BAĞINI ANLAMAK: HUGO CHÁVEZ VE DONALD TRUMP ÖRNEKLERİ

Miguel AlbertoBERVIS CANELON

Küresel Siyaset ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Tezi (İngilizce)

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Bu tez, popülist lider ile takipçileri arasındaki bağın oluşumunu sorgulamaktadır. Bu ilişki, popülizm olgusunu anlamının anahtarıdır. Şimdiye kadar yapılan araştırmalar, popülist liderin halk ile kurduğu güçlü bağı genellikle bireysel karizma ile açıklamışlardır. Bu çalışma, son zamanların en tartışmalı popülist figürlerinden ikisi olan Hugo Chávez ve Donald Trump'ın seçim kampanyası konuşmalarını inceleyerek popülist lider-halk bağını oluşturan mekanizmaları ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Bu amaçla çalışmada yönlendirilmiş içerik analizi yönteminden yararlanılmıştır. Bulgular, popülist liderlerin anlatılarına dahil edilen ve lider-halk bağını oluşturmak için kullanılan beş mekanizmaya işaret etmektedir. Bunlar "liderin" kendi inşası, sözsüz iletişim, halk kavramının inşası, bir krizdurumunun tanımlanması ve halkın mobilize edilmesidir. Çalışma, lider-halk bağının bu mekanizmalarla kurulduğu, ancak bu mekanizmaların etkinliğinin ülkelerin siyasi/kültürel bağlamlarına göre değişiklik gösterebileceğini ortaya koyar. Ayrıca, lider ve halk arasında oluşan bağın gücü, halkın, popülist liderin kullandığı mekanizmalara etkin katılımına bağlıdır.

**ANAHTAR KELİMELEER:**popülizm, lider-halk bağı, karizma, popülist liderlik, içerik analizi, Hugo Chávez, Donald Trump

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## ABBREVIATIONS

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

DT: Donald Trump

HC: Hugo Chávez

MDS: Most Different System Design

PDVSA: Petróleos de Venezuela (English: Petroleum of Venezuela)

UNASUR: Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (English: The Union of South American Nations)

USA: United States of America

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## PREFACE

Choosing to talk about populism was an almost automatic decision since I consider the subject complex but fascinating. The interest was generated through the years and through experiences getting to know the world. For the first 16 years of my life, I lived in Venezuela, a country that, although it is considered a democracy, has been under a highly controversial system of government for more than 20 years, especially when contrasted with democratic fundamentals. This system, based on socialist doctrines, came from the hand of a well-known left-wing populist leader, Hugo Chávez.

In my years living in Venezuela, I never had an interest in politics of any kind, and I think this happened because I did not know any other reality than the one, I lived in. Going abroad and living in different countries made me reflect on those other realities and how a populist candidate can change the entire course of a country once elected as president of that nation. Today after several years that I left Venezuela, I still consider that I have no political preferences, neither left nor right. Instead, I see politics as something that deserves attention from the academic community to do research that addresses the phenomena that alter the democracies of our world, such as populism. Understanding populism, even more, the relationship of the populist leader with the people aroused a deep curiosity, which led me to this thesis work. In the process, I took plenty of time to read the literature on the subject, watch Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump audiovisual material, read news about them, and find a suitable method to complete the investigation.

Not being a follower, neither an opponent of Chávez nor Trump made me analyze things more impartially. This analysis took me several months but involved a valuable reflective part as a researcher. During that time, I could rethink the ideas obtained from the study, understand them, and explain them more clearly. Everything described here led me to this point, the thesis, where I finally present the study findings, hoping to contribute to the political research on populism—hoping to expand knowledge of the populist leader-people bond. Improving our understanding of populism can improve the democracies condition in which we live or in which we dream of living.

Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my wife Ana, to my family Yasmin, Miguel, Liz and Latif Bervis, to Hazel and Mario Zurita, to my advisor Prof. Cerem I. Cenker-Özek and other professors of the Antalya Bilim University Institute of Post-graduate Education. Last but not least, my gratitude to God to whom do I owe my life. All of you were of great help and support while doing this research work.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the populist leaders and their followers is a topic that has been arousing interest in populism research (Jansen, 2011; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Even so, there are still few studies that explain the formation of the populist leader-people bond. Understanding how the populist leader-people bond is formed can be the key to clarify the blind spots of populism, and in turn to clarify the connection of populism with democracy. Populism closely relates to understanding of the leader-people bond; because just as there can be no populism without the people, neither can there be populism without a populist leader. Populism needs both to exist. That is why the present study explores the mechanisms with which the populist leader-people bond is constructed. Some research based on the study of political discourse (Hidalgo-Tenorio & Benítez-Castro, 2021; Casullo, 2019; Hurtado, 2015; Frajman, 2014) shows that populists utilize an extensive narrative full of promises that seek to solve the problems of the people. Even though problems are inherent to the society where populism is trying to exert control, many times these problems are created in the people's imaginary (Browne & Diehl, 2019) by the populist leader him/herself. This can suggest that there must be a degree of trust on the part of the people towards the leader when it comes to embracing these constructed problems on a personal level. That trust may also arise from the leader-people relationship.

Related to that thought, the electoral discourses can be a key to understanding this populist plan of creating a bond with the people. This is because the electoral scenarios take place in an environment of political confrontation, where various candidates compete to win people's support. For this moment, what sets the populist candidate apart from other candidates may also be related to the use of a compelling appeal that encourages a reaction in the people. Political candidates, but especially populists project their image through the messages they transmit. That is why this thesis will establish a comparison between two famous populist leaders, Hugo Chávez, and Donald Trump, to find out if, despite their differences, similar mechanisms are used that lead to the construction of the leader-people bond.

As is well-known, populism's uniqueness relay on the action of reincorporation of people to the political stage (Canovan, 2002) and, at the same time, on the reincorporation of issues that were excluded from the public discussion from former governments. This process is done by the mobilization of "the people" (Weyland, 2001; Canovan, 1999) that, in turn, begins through the personalization of a leader (Akkerman et al., 2013; Taggart, 2000) as a unique mark on populist movements, since mobilizations need leadership. Populism's emphasis on both the leader and the people brings up interesting queries; how does the populist leader build a connection with the people? What are the mechanisms with which the populist leaders construct the leader-people bond? What marks can we find in leaders' speeches and public appearances that lead us to this construction of the leader-people relationship? Do they all rely on the same methods, ways, and words?

The objective of the present study is to shed light to these questions. Defining mechanisms with which populist leaders persuade people will help us to understand their effective manner to construct a leader-people bond. This effort will also contribute to the current line of research on the leader-people connection (Diehl, 2019; Mudde

& Kaltwasser, 2017; Di Tella, 1997). Aspects such as political priorities, political realism, use of the media, personal trajectory of the leader towards representation and society, and outer limits of the popular will, are components of particular leadership manners that cannot simply be disregarded, with the frequent generalization of populist categorizations and their variety of definitions. There should be remarkable mechanisms and dynamics that show that the strong connection populist leaders make with the people is beyond the evident essence of anti-pluralism or anti-elitism traits. For the leader-people bond to really exist, we can find innumerable possibilities, of course, given that politicians are not the same. That is why this investigation will explore the possibilities by making an attempt to break down as many dimensions as possible, inside Chávez's and Trump's electoral discourses, to seek meaningful information about leaders' mechanisms to connect with their followers, since this thesis specifically focuses on the construction of the populist leader-people bond. Therefore, the crucial question that this study focuses on, remains: To what extent do leaders in different regions and with different contextual factors, following the logic of populism, manage to build a solid bond with the people?

In order to undertake this research, the literature review chapter introduces a conceptual discussion on populism. For this purpose, three main approaches to populism, dominant in literature (Mouffe, 2019; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Laclau, 2005; Canovan, 2004; Mudde, 2004), are presented. Different empirical studies which reflect these approaches are also discussed in this chapter. This reference from the literature eventually helps to hypothesize about different mechanisms which are utilized by populist leaders to construct a strong bond with the people. Lastly, this chapter also presents the cases for the empirical analysis of this thesis, which are Hugo Chávez's 2012 electoral speeches and Donald Trump's 2016 electoral speeches. Once the main research question is located inside the larger literature and is discussed within the context of the empirical cases, the next chapter, which is the third chapter, will focus on methodology. In the methodology chapter the preference of the qualitative method is exposed. Furthermore, the data analysis and coding processes are also explained in the context of the directed content analysis method.

This study found five mechanisms that refer to the populist leader-people bond. These are: self-construction as "the leader," the non-verbal communication, the construction of the concept of "the people," the identification of a crisis and the people's mobilization. These mechanisms will be presented one by one in chapter four which is the empirical research chapter of this thesis. In chapter four, in addition to presenting and explaining the mechanisms found in the analysis, examples that support each statement derived from the investigation will be offered.

Finally, the following chapters, which are the fifth and sixth, will go around the contributions derived from this work. Each finding regarding the mechanisms that refer to the populist leader-people bond is explained. This explanation is done in order to proceed to the conclusions in how the populist leader-people bond is formed in vein with this research, and to offer suggestions on further research about this topic.

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1. The All-Time Challenge: Defining Populism

There are different ways to define populism. The existence of alternative conceptual approaches to populism, in turn, creates a problem of conceptual definition. (Collier and Mahon, 1993). At the same time, however, it has become a truism among academics to begin writing on populism by bemoaning the lack of conceptual clarity (Panizza, 2005). Despite this, it is necessary to find the general harmony in the peculiarities of the exposed concepts and use one that fits here; so that the conceptual foundation in this study can be solid. That is why, for the structure of an investigation on the subject, this becomes the first and most challenging part of the thesis because untangling the populism concept will open our appreciation to the understanding of what follows.

Bearing this in mind, some of the notions used by scholars consider populism as a discourse in “a way of constructing the political” (Laclau, 2005, p. 11), as a “political strategy” (Weyland, 2004, pp. 31-32), or as an ideology that is “thin” (Mudde, 2004, p. 544) to describe a society divided into two divergent and homogeneous groups. Others bring the concept more towards the civic communication spectrum, considering it as “an appeal to ‘the people’ against the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society” (Canovan, 1999, p. 2). As “a style of political communication of political actors that refers to the people” (Jagers&Walgrave, 2007, p. 322). Furthermore, studies in the last decade also refer to populism as “a specific kind of political practice that is observable in different dimensions, such as the communicative, ideological or organizational” (Diehl, 2019, p. 113). Again as “a particular form of political discourse” (Hurtado, 2015, p. 41) or as “a form of exclusivist identity politics” established on a “moralistic imagination of politics” (Muller, 2016, pp. 12-27).

It is this order of ideas when conceptualizing populist phenomenon, the problem of accuracy can be faced, since it has the capacity to change its opinion, attitude, or image effortlessly and according to its convenience (Taggart, 2002). That happens due to its different factions, colors, or even shades that come to light depending on the different political scenarios. From the beginning, scholars are trying to solve the populist enigma as “the sensation” that is causing considerable changes in the democratic system around the world. Those efforts to solve such a mystery relies on questioning the nature of democracy and promoting a more genuine “general will” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). The exposition of the above comes with the need to understand that despite the attempts, and in the absence of the possibility of globally conceptualizing populism, it is still necessary to start from a point that allows us to delimit the inquiry. For this to happen, the following segments will review the concept, from at least three dominant approaches among the scholars, that will precisely help to develop this particular investigation. That, in turn, aims to identify how the populist leader effectively builds a bond with “the people”.

### 2.1.1. Populism as an Ideology

Cranston (2022) defines ideology as “a system of ideas that aspires both to explain the world and to change it.” Alternatively, Mudde and RoviraKaltwasser (2017, p. 6) propose it as “a body of normative ideas about the nature of man and society... a view of the world is and should be.” With these two definitions in mind, in this case, it could be construed as a set of thoughts that characterize a political movement, which is trying to change the realm. Consequently, any attempt to deconstruct the concept of populism must face the impasse of defining it at least as ideology.

To face this, there is a group of authors (Albertazzi& McDonnell, 2008; Papas &Kreisi, 2015; Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008) who imply that we should conceive populism as a broader part of a set of ideas that transcends rhetoric and digs into the philosophy of the political parties. This crucial group of academics considers populism not just as any ideology but rather a malleable one, that is called: “thin” (Canovan, 2002; Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008). This point of view notes that if the populist system itself is not enough to define the political-ideological content, then it has to feed on other thick ideologies to shape the objectives in a more precise way. What is being said, according to Stanley (2008), is that populism is not a solid/gross enough notion. Instead, could be considered a complementary ideology. This is not something that necessarily has to be seen as unfavorable, is a way of explaining that; when populism is understood as a dependent ideology, it is forced to appear linked to characteristics of different other ideologies in order to survive in the political arena. To better understand this interpretation of populism, we must perceive the society divided “into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’...” (Mudde &RoviraKaltwasser, 2013, pp. 149-150). Those are incompatible factions as the good and evil, the uncorrupted and the flawed (Albertazzi& McDonnell, 2008; Canovan, 2004; Hawkins, 2009; Mudde, 2007). They are homogeneous because the individuals who are part of it share the same characteristics, and are antagonistic (Mudde, 2004) since there is no compatibility between these two groups; instead, they oppose each other. In this scenario populism has the ability to adapt to the environment, but permanently anchored to the *volontegenerale* or “general will” of the people, as Mudde points out (2004, p. 543); (Mudde &RoviraKaltwasser, 2013, p. 150). It is about highlighting the divergence between the main actors and converting people’s affairs into a totalizing general will that seeks hegemony.

As claimed by this perspective, for “the people” to be able to confront the malevolent elite, it is necessary to make use of the “democratizing force” (Mudde &RoviraKaltwasswer, 2017, p. 18) “popular sovereignty and majority rule” (Canovan, 2002, p. 25). That is, the exercise of the “general will” as the only way to rule according to shared interests. Therefore, it is possible to refer that populism becomes an ideology as a resource for societies in crisis to generate democratization of health, education, and the general welfare of “the people”. This somehow generates a demand to restructure the socio-political order through the activation of this susceptible society expressed in a uniform group, “the people.” A group that until this point was passive in the political arena, and now ends up giving their will to a leader who claims to know them perfectly. A thought founded on the fact that he/she is part of this pure entity.

Seeing populism from this perspective could be favorable because, in a way, it can explain the different forms populism takes to adapt to the political wings of the left or right, to give an example. Perhaps seeing it as a “distinct ideology” and implying that its nature makes it “incapable of standing alone as a practical political ideology” (Stanley, 2008, p. 95) since it is not a ‘full’ or complete thought, it is not a barrier to grasp that it has the ability to move through the same channels as thick ideologies. In other words, it can use the same methods to achieve its defining political objectives. As a closure, populism, seen as a thin ideology, chooses the prominent elements that suit it best from other ideologies in order to represent those who are excluded, “the people.” This concept presents populism as something inherent to the political system. It is a consequence of the failures of the political system. It is seen as a process that takes place in parallel with other procedures, and apparently does not appear all at once. Instead, it feeds on what exists in traditional politics to reach power. That is why researchers such as Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) imply that this phenomenon is not limited to specific cases but rather helps to extend it to other political movements and actors that, at first glance, would not fit within this categorization.

### **2.1.2. Populism as a Style**

For this approach, the features of political communication and the way these are used to address the people are essential (Jagers&Walgrave, 2007). For the reason that, in this procedure, it will be possible to identify when we are in the presence of a populist leader, and possible construction of crucial concepts such as “us” and “them.” The good guys, and the villains in that particular political scenario. However, to consider this, it is essential to contemplate that populism as a style may depend on its relationship with the mass media, resulting in two different conceptions of “mediatic populism” (Mazzoleni, 2014, pp. 42-56). As Mazzoleni (2014) explains, one has to do with contemporary media, while the other has to do with the ideological character of some media. Still in both conceptions, populism can be related to forms of political communication (Bimber, 1998; Jagers&Walgrave, 2007; Tarchi, 2002). Where the populist leader [the sender], the potential follower [receptor], the populist discourse [message] and the media [channel], are the classic components that explore communication studies since mediatizing politics became a trend.

Even though those are classic components, it is not about limiting this view to traditional media. This would neither imply an annulment of the populist leaders who emerged before the appearance of television as a possible disadvantage in their proselytizing strategy. On the contrary, it is about recognizing that populists in the past used the streets and the main squares for their scenic appearance and its objectives were equally achieved, in terms of effectiveness. In today’s world dominated by television sets and digital platforms, leaders have found ways to stay in touch and build a closer relationship with their followers. Especially, social media allows them to communicate almost permanently and without the intermediation or limitations of traditional media.

The truth is that conventional or contemporary platforms are the perfect paraphernalia where populist speech addresses the cause of the current crisis by naming and demonizing an enemy group. This process results in mobilization and maneuvering of people's emotions and generates hostility towards evil adversaries. The content of each message is generally characterized by its simplicity, newness, differentiation, and a notorious charge of feelings and bravery to defend "the people" (Taggart, 2000; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Mudde, 2007; Moffitt, 2016). This is how we begin to see the nuances of a calculated *modus operandi*. Certainly, we may also be in front of a performance where rhetorical elements, such as speeches, simple words or sentences, and 'charming' elements, such as personal appearance, are consciously employed in the presentation of the political subject before the audience (Moffitt, 2016, pp. 54-55).

More importantly, Moffitt and Tormey (2014) point to three central elements that characterize "the populist political style": [1] affinity with the people - a way of appealing to "the people" as opposed to the "elite," which implies that the populist leader must show and achieve a connection with "the people" and distance himself from the elite -, [2] Bad manners - referring to the fact that populists do not behave under the appropriate forms of conduct in the political outline. At the same time, this term implies that the variations of what is considered a 'decent or proper way of doing politics' must be considered since those are culturally specific perceptions. In other words, manners will change according to the social context of the region being studied -, and [3] crisis performance - Populists tend to induce the perception of crisis through dramatization, in order to make their demands legitimate. Therefore, they become able to act immediately and even to justify taking extraordinary decisions- (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, pp. 390 - 394).

The attributes of this approach to populism are based on appealing to "the people" with a differentiated political outline. This is by increasing the perception of calamities to get more supporters; and in having objectionable ways of doing and relating to politics and its opponents, (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014) embracing the colloquial, the simple, the sentimental and even the vulgar way of doing things, through the adoption of popular ways of speaking, expressing feelings and judgements. Hence, it is to be expected that in many cases, individuals will react to these powerful stimuli. In this context, for instance, the media can turn into a conciliator between the populist leader and voters, where the populist tries to distance him/herself from his/her enemies. This implies various forms of dogmatic action that are developed using "a strategic communication style, which aims to satisfy the expectations and gain the trust of a clientele" (Valdés, 2007, p. 27). This tactic, as pointed out earlier, includes the use of linguistic and aesthetic features that are being put into action through all possible channels, clearly including the media. As Moffitt and Tormey (2014) suggest, the relationship between the leader and "the people" is more crucial than the populist narrative's content itself. This does not mean that the content is not essential, rather it is about classifying priorities and directing all the tools and efforts to the relationship with "the people."

### 2.1.3. Populism as a Political Strategy

To understand this conception clearly, it is required to consider that in order to get the support of popular factions, which are usually the largest in number, a strategy or logic must be executed. Laclau and Mouffe (2018, p. 41) refer to a concept of strategy that is defined as an exercise in a rational and planned manner “relations of power, which are possible from the moment in which a subject of will can be isolated from an ‘environment’...” In other words, the populist program tries to build political subjects by taking them out of their own sphere of influence. The previous method is necessary in order to achieve dominion and, of course, make their own realities become - almost or totally - absolute truths. Therefore, the focus goes on the formal structure of the discourse and not on its content. The discourse “constitutes the primary ground for the constitution of objectivity” (Laclau, 2016, p. 92) since it acts as “one of the ways of building group unity” (Laclau, 2005, p. 82). The way to make this possible is through a plan or a carefully thought-out approach to put into action. As expected, the populist discourse is based on the appeal to “the people”, as the main subject, and on the creation of popular identity through the logic of difference and equivalence (Laclau, 2005). This procedure moves along with the use of a variety of other rhetorical resources. For instance, the development of signs and symbolic elements that allow reinforcing the identity, facilitating the representation that is given to the populist figure.

To strengthen this statement, it should be considered that: “in modern times, the politics of faith has exploited two main languages: a religious version and what we might loosely call an economic version” (Oakeshott, 1998, p. 89). To do this, these populist expressions make use of various unique resources of national heroes, emerging identities, modern institutions, or religion. This in turn directs society around a redemptive policy, which makes exclusive use of said resources, managing to position him/herself against his/her rivals as the only representation of “the people”. As it can be noticed, contenders are essential to understand this view because it is thanks to them that any faction, like populists, can really build an identity. Authors Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) assure that; “the construction of antagonisms and the institution of political frontiers between agents are partly constitutive of identities and of social objectivity itself.” (p. 10), meaning that identities are defined based on another excluded character that is on the exterior, and the political is created against a fascinating opposite figure. Therefore, let us remember that thanks to not being immediately related to any ideological position or a specific political scheme, populism can use any opponent to build its own identity.

Continuing in this line of thought, “the idea of antagonism also reveals the existence of conflicts for which there is no rational solution.” (Errejón & Mouffe, 2016, p. 13). However, it is in this situation that it is possible to create and execute a political strategy where hegemonic power is at stake. Considering that hegemonic practices seek to redesign the conceptual and cultural framework to establish their ideas as unique, for the discourse model, these practices are a form of political activity. They are shaped by different identities that are in a joint project (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000) or constant battle for power. The discourse places populist candidates in the vision of what is “good,” versus enemies being related with the idea of “evil” (Mouffe, 2009).

This is how populism creates new elements or makes use of existing ones to help identify and create a new identity. From this perspective, politics “consists in the creation of an ‘us,’ and this necessarily implies the distinction of a ‘them.’...” (Errejón&Mouffe, 2016, p. 50). This kind of politics generates strategies to increase the contender’s power, which in turn implies reducing the chances of putting the political focus on other actors involved. For this, they seek to reduce the possibilities of expressing pluralism, typical of democratic politics. Undoubtedly, it is in the crises of representation and other phenomena of nature that directly impact the factual limits and possibilities of contemporary democracies where the origins of populist movements are found. In summary, this vision understands that populism proposes the creation of “the people” as a political and social subject. That is why the process of creating a popular identity, the discourse, and the different logics - differential and equivalent - (Laclau, 2005) play an essential role in it. Here populism creates a political and social space divided by an insider and an outsider that needs to be excluded, and only this division gives a meaning to the insider. (Canovan, 2004).

## **2.2. Three Approaches and the Leader-People Connection**

The leader’s figure is a common recurring theme in all three approaches. This is why there are scholars (Thiers &Wehner, 2022; Nai& Martínez, 2019) that discuss the styles of populist leadership. Thus, when we talk about the ways of doing things, authors such as Mudde and RoviraKaltwasser (2017) point out that charisma is a characteristic of populist strongman leaders. According to them who are based on Max Weber’s notes, “charismatic leadership is about a specific bond between leader and followers, which is defined at least as much by the expectations and perceptions of the followers as by the individual characteristics of the leader” (Mudde &RoviraKaltwasser, 2017, p. 66), a statement that the last authors question when they come across the discussion of the universality of the concept of charisma. An obstacle that they do not solve but rather channel it saying that this is an individual characteristic that is usually defined by culture. Mudde and RoviraKaltwasser (2017) later cite two examples of political leaders (Collor de Mello in Brasil and Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands) who can be considered charismatic due to the fact that they came to power by forming a connection with the people “without the backing of a strong organization or clear political philosophy” (p. 67).

In the case of empirical studies of populism as ideology, some researchers (Spruyt et al., 2016; Akkerman, et al., 2013; Stanley, 2011) try to explain the leader-people bond as a result of people’s pluralist, anti-elitist and populist attitudes such as: “...opposition to the elite...the Manichean division between ‘good’ and ‘evil’... its conception of democracy, in particular the will of the people (their sovereignty)...” (Akkerman, et al., 2013, p. 8), and their party preferences.

In a study carried out on Slovak voting behavior (Stanley, 2011), it was suggested that the people’s populist attitudes did not seem to have the influence that was thought in relation to the electoral behavior. The author explained that this occurred

because in “the Slovak case those populist attitudes which do appear to influence outcomes to relate more clearly to the moral and normative aspect of populism than to its ontological aspect” (Stanley, 2011, p. 269). Also, that occurred because the ideology of populism is too thin, which leads “to examine the role of populist ideology as a means of communication, rather than an appeal to deep-seated notions of how “the political” is structured and works” (Stanley, 2011, p. 269). Different from the Stanley’s (2011) conclusions, in a study applied in the Netherlands, it was found “a significant and positive correlation between populist attitudes and the intention to vote for populist political parties,” (Akkerman, et al., 2013, p. 21). Making it clear that not only people’s populist attitudes can be measured or associated with party preferences but that they can be related to the people’s electoral intentions towards populist candidates/parties (Akkerman et al., 2013). Moreover, Spruyt and his collaborators (2016) said that people’s populist attitudes are developed in individuals ignorant of political issues. These populist attitudes along with feelings of vulnerability are key factors in people’s support for the populist leader/party. The authors claimed that populist discourse influences the least educated groups in society (Spruyt, et al. 2016). In their research, Spruyt and his collaborators (2016) studied the Belgian region of Flanders and also concluded that “people’s material position proved to be a relatively good predictor for populism. With increasing wealth, the less likely people were to support populism” (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 9), unlike the lower classes who are more likely to develop feelings that lead to populism. But what stood out most from this latest study was that “populist parties and politicians offer vulnerable people the discursive stepping stones that translate their daily experiences and concerns into the support for populism” (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 10).

Following up, when we turn to the vision of populism as a strategy, researchers like Weyland (2001), who, after exploring several South American cases, concludes that populist leaders “seek to create a particularly intense connection to their followers” (2001, p. 13) through charisma as a main tool. “Many populist leaders eventually seek to ‘routinize their charisma’ and solidify their mass following by introducing elements of party organization or clientelism” (Weyland, 2001, p. 14). Considering that clientelism is a “relationship between individuals with unequal... social status (“the boss” and his “clients”) that entails the reciprocal exchange of... services based on a personal link that is generally perceived in terms of moral obligation,”<sup>1</sup> it can be really seen that the leader’s ability to attend to and solve the problems of “the people” is essential for a relationship to exist between them. This report clearly puts all the populist power on one individual and his type of leadership. Taking this previous resource as a base, Frajman (2014) studies the efficiency of the media and the strategy of the late president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, with his weekly television program *Aló Presidente* [hello president]. According to Frajman (2014), the connection with “the masses” was achieved through Chávez’s frequent public appearances. Those reoccurring apparitions: made his success and talent known and generated strong affective bonds with the people. In this case Chávez’s method is “a combination of various propaganda techniques and Chávez’s trademark improvised monologues, which notoriously could

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<sup>1</sup> Clientelism meaning. Source: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/clientelism>

last for several hours” (Frajman, 2014, p. 504). To Frajman (2014) the relationship Chávez built with “the people” was due to televised indoctrination.

For their part, Thiers and Wehner (2022), sympathizing with this vision of populism as a strategy, and pointing out the importance of a charismatic type of leadership, they also add that “populist leaders need to be creative in differentiating themselves from the established elite that they question” (p. 3-4). By using the cases of Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump from the psychological perspective of the personality of these individuals and their particular characteristics, Thiers and Wehner (2022) defend the idea of a political strategy executed by the populist leader, “to connect with the people as a way to achieve and then retain political power” (p. 2). Their conclusions effectively showed that “the impact of populism on foreign policy can be linked with these leaders’ tendency to enhance the nexus with the people in standing against an elite at home and abroad” (Thiers & Wehner, 2022, p. 9).

From the populism as a style vision and returning to Belgium as a case of study, Jagers and Walgrave (2007) researched on Belgian political parties’ discourses. In their investigation the connection between the leader and “the people” apparently relies on an anti-system communication style, and in the way of excluding specific segments of the population. This was demonstrated by the authors with examples of various Belgian parties and their communication styles to achieve proximity with “the people.” Their conclusions said that “at least in the Belgian context in 1999–2001... parties that often refer to the people also attack the establishment and exclude groups” (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 335). Populist parties/leader’s narrative come along with anti-elitist and exclusivist marks, and this in turn confirms the authors’ theory about the populist type of political communication consistency.

In another context, for Oliver and Rahn (2016), the ties between the populist and his/her followers are solidified when the populist leader reduces the psychological gap by executing “the populist style” (Oliver & Rahn, 2016). To establish this idea, the authors studied a series of speeches and determined “populist language” scores among seven candidates in the 2016 United States elections. According to that, Oliver and Rahn (2016) realized that “American populism in the twenty-first century has a conservative tinge and is felt most acutely in the political turmoil of the Republican Party” (Oliver & Rahn, 2016, p. 202). The study demonstrated that the populist approaches, specially carried out by Donald Trump and Ben Carson were predominant since their supporters were assembled in the dimensions of “national affiliation, mistrust of expertise and anti-elitism” (Oliver & Rahn, 2016, p. 197-198) typical of the populist phenomena. To this only remains to wonder, can these dimensions of populism explain the link discussed in other cases?

An investigation by Moffitt (2017) tries to explain the leader-people connection through a construction that the populist leader makes about the people. The researcher focused on the construction of the “people” by populist leaders above the national level. To understand this perspective, the construction of the people of the European Union was presented as an example. Moffitt (2017) ensured that if viewed from a local perspective, the populist leader needs to work on “affinity” with individuals, fostering nationalist sentiments, for example. Nevertheless, according to this research, for an international level, “populism can exist without nationalism... whereby political actors

appeal to the transnational “people” versus “the elite” (Moffitt, 2017, p. 13). The author also points out the role of the media in the populist leader’s attempt to connect with a “transnational people”, since media are “directly implicated in the back-and-forth negotiations of the meaning of ‘the people’ between populist leaders, constituencies and audiences....” (Moffitt, 2016, p. 108). The author concludes by saying that building a transnational people is much more difficult than building a national one, but in the end the populist leader can achieve his/her goal of becoming the voice of *national* or *transnational* people, connecting with them through the mass media.

In other order of ideas, as pointed out by Casullo, “the link proposed by the populist leader is based on making the followers present within the political space that was forbidden to them” (2019, Loc. 909). This bond is not summed up with the objective of asking for votes, but rather, due to an experience, a history, that the populist leader shares with his/her followers. In that experience the populist leader self-assumes a fight on behalf of all the oppressed against the oppressors. As the author continues to say, an experience where the leader mythologizes, resorting to emotions and thus achieving his/her goals. That argument is supported by other authors, for instance, Hidalgo and Benítez (2021) mentioned that Donald Trump in the USA, used the emotional factor as a tool to address the crisis generated by immigrants, and with that be able to achieve the favor of his followers. Another author (De la Torre, 2013) also confirms this argument, when he gives the example of Juan Domingo Perón saying that the Argentinian ex-president is; “portrayed as a charismatic leader who appealed to the emotions of these irrational masses to get to power and to govern” (p. 8).

### 2.3. Fundamental Concepts for the Analysis

For previous approaches, populism can be characterized by the use of rhetoric, the rejection of the mediations associated with “the elites”, and the approach to “the people” as a manifestation of insurgency against the established order. Hence, other approaches of populism could be considered to contribute to the understanding of the leader-people bond. Perhaps an approach where populism is seen as a political practice on the edges of democracy, an approach where populism resembles a mirror in which democracy can be seen as unpleasant and where populism is also seen as an experience about to become a possible reverse of democracy (Arditi, 2017). That is why this research considers Paula Diehl’s (2019) concept of populism important as well, since she assured that “the relationship between the leader and the people is a key element in understanding the effects of populism on democracy and, more importantly, that this relationship causes a twist in democratic representation” (Diehl, 2019, p. 111).

Perhaps to understand Diehl’s (2019) vision, it should be considered that this perception tries to wrap up the former approaches of populism. For Diehl (2011), populism is expressed in “Dimensions” which are framed within this “specific type of political practice” (Diehl, 2019, p. 113). The dimensions of this conception of populism are [1] ideological: according to Diehl (2019), it is “the belief that political power belongs to the people” (p. 114), a thought that is, in turn, based on the vision of Mudde

(2004) and his concept of general will.<sup>2</sup>With the formation of this principle, populism is directly connected to democracy. In this dimension, the central character is the leader, who manages to maintain a strong connection with “the people”, to then, fight the elites together. [2] Communicative: this aspect involves, among other things, “the strong invocation of the people, the appeal to common sense, and words suggesting collectivity and dichotomy” (Diehl, 2019, p. 114), which are basically the ideas of a rhetoric loaded with messages transmitted in extraordinary ways.<sup>3</sup>Finally, [3] organizational: here the leaders by their own means “build hierarchical and direct relationships with followers” (Diehl, 2011, pp. 287– 89).Something close to what happens in the strategic approach of populism.<sup>4</sup>

Prior, there were other scholars who spoke briefly about the leader-people bond, mostly linked to the charisma of the populist actor (Di Tella, 1997; Jansen, 2011; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Of those pointed, Jansen’s work should be highlighted, since the scholar assured that populism cannot be reduced “to the characteristics of a single personality but exists in the relationships between leaders and supporters” (2011, p. 79). Although Jansen (2011) does not give more details on that particular statement, this argument could suggest that populism can be clarified through the leader-people bond. For this reason and according to Diehl’s (2019) reasoning, when it comes to examine populism effectively, it is necessary to consider the procedures that occur in the relation of the populist actor with his/her followers. For Diehl (2019), those procedures are: “(1) the people’s identification with the leader, (2) the legitimation of leadership by presupposing similarity between the leader and the people, and (3) a strong emotional bond that provides unquestioned trust in the leader” (Diehl, 2019, p. 126). Consequently, these three procedures encompass a series of key concepts for this thesis’ line of thinking and research. Regardless of whether these key concepts work or not by themselves, depending on the political scenarios where they are deployed, they continue to be elements of harmonization that populism needs to incorporate into any of the approaches that try to explain it.

To identify these key concepts, it must be considered that the populist plot idealizes a vision of society where a moral transformation of social relations occurs (Arias, 2017, p. 154). That transformation presents one group of individuals that is described as “good” -the people- while another group is condemned as “bad” -the elite-. That is why it is concluded by a populist leader that the people must exercise popular sovereignty, which means to govern themselves (Arias, 2017, pp. 153-154). Definitely, populist phenomena involve the creation and mobilization of “the people,” a concept of “general will” as a crucial attribute of “the people,” the allocation of “corrupt elites,” and a “leader” figure with its defining features as well.

Following, these key concepts will be clarified, in order to connect them with the understanding of the leader-people bond.

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<sup>2</sup> See section 2.1.1. Populism as an ideology

<sup>3</sup> See section 2.1.2. populism as a style.

<sup>4</sup> See section 2.1.3. Populism as a Strategy

### 2.3.1. The People

This primary concept is “the heartland,” a place “in which, in the populist imagination, a virtuous and unified population resides” (Taggart, 2000, p. 95). This singularly named, imaginary community, cataloged as “the people,” precisely became the heart and most relevant component of populism among scholars (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000). In the “populist myth” described by Casullo (2019), “the people” are considered “a collective hero,” which is complemented by its ally star, the leader. Nevertheless, seen imaginatively or not, we are in front of a seemingly homogeneous and self-governing entity. Through the construction of “the people,” the populist leader or figure aims to assemble a new social identity that involves all citizens as a whole body. That is why this research will consider the following voices to explain that insight:

Laclau (2005) implies that “the people” is a concept empty of meaning that makes use of the phenomenon capacity of framing various connotations under the same cosmivision, thus reaching the most significant number of individuals and tying them under a standard label, even if they differ in their values and needs. Furthermore, “the people” can be seen as an organism in which the sovereignty of a country resides; that is to say, the citizens of a specific territory are the primary source of power in a democracy, as expressed by the former US president Abraham Lincoln, “a government of the people, by the people, and for the people” cited by Mudde and RoviraKaltwasser (2017, p.10). With this vision, populism tries to return power to this group in particular. A power ‘kidnapped’ by governments in office.

Additionally, for Mudde and RoviraKaltwasser (2017), it is about blending “cultural traditions and popular values” (p. 10) for the recognition of groups excluded by power due to their sociocultural condition. That is to say, the construction of “the people” has a moral setting in which the populist actors present it as a pure, good entity that battles against institutions and influential entities in society, defined as the enemy, who intends to take away its sovereignty (Mudde, 2004). Seeing Canovan (1999), the notion becomes even more interesting in the criterion of separating “the people” from “the nation” since these communities turn out to be defined by ethnic and civic terms. This implies the assumption that all individuals born in the country are part of “the people,” forming a community that shares a common life and the same roots. Deriving in the conviction of “national preference... that is, the idea that the country’s own people should have priority in jobs, housing, and welfare” (Mudde & RoviraKaltwasser, 2013, p.160) over outsiders, therefore this last group should be distanced and excluded.

#### 2.3.1.1. General Will

This concept resides in the interest of reorganizing the existing socio-political order through popular legitimation. To understand this thought, we should consider

general will as “the capacity of the people to join together into a community and legislate to enforce their common interest.” Rousseau’s definition is quoted by Mudde and RoviraKaltwasser (2017, p. 16). For Stanley (2008), “popular sovereignty is uncontested as the normative principle that the general will of the people can be articulated and should be privileged over the preferences of the elite” (p. 104). The same author alleges that this principle could be explained using two other adjacent concepts; [1] majoritarianism as a fundamental piece to strengthen the genuineness of the will of “the people.” This means that it is essentially a greater consensus of the majority in favor of a policy to be more credible. [2] Along with authenticity, a quality that allows the actor to pretend to be real and pure representativeness. Remembering that being a regular member and spokesperson of “the people,” he/she has the authority, amid voices that are neither legitimate nor authentic, to highlight the truths of all individuals that make up the group. “This is the point at which the positive valorization of the people and denigration of the elite becomes relevant to populist discourse” (Stanley, 2008, p. 105).

In the populist notion, the general will is oppressed by the elite, but its reconquest can lead to the revolution with the support of the leader, who places him/herself inside “the people” and who seeks to spot the power back in the hands of this last group. “One of the practical consequences of populism is the strategic promotion of institutions that enable the construction of the presumed general will” (Mudde & RoviraKaltwasser, 2017, p. 17), such as the establishment of referendums or constituent assemblies, as Hugo Chávez did in Venezuela to remain in power in 2004<sup>5</sup>, to modify the constitution in 2007<sup>6</sup> and 2009<sup>7</sup>, or finally the call for the creation of a national constituent assembly shortly after assuming power in 1999<sup>8</sup>.

### 2.3.2. The Elite

This is a concept generally linked to the moral issue within populism since this group is constantly classified as corrupt (Mudde & RoviraKaltwasser, 2013; Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn, 2014), empty-headed (Taggart, 2000), reckless (Rooduijn et. al, 2012) and egocentric (Weyland, 2001). The elites are “defined on the basis of power, i.e., they include most people who hold leading positions within politics, the economy, the media, and the arts” (Mudde & RoviraKaltwasser, 2017, p. 12) and have betrayed “the people” in addition to stripping them of their sovereignty. It is in this context that populist characters feel legitimized in their fight against the establishment since they are

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<sup>5</sup><https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/16/international/americas/chvez-is-declared-the-winner-in-venezuela-referendum.html>

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/world/americas/03venezuela.html>

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/16/hugo-chavez-indefinite-rule>

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/01/venezuelas-dubious-new-constituent-assembly-explained/>

not part of that immoral organization. Fundamentally, it is the nemesis band of “the people,” the enemy to whom all evils are attributed, and all the responsibilities of the current situation are charged; they cannot be trusted and must be gotten rid of. Nonetheless, at the same time, elites are “a crucial component of the attempt to construct an identity” (Taggart, 2000, p. 94), something necessary for populist expressions. For instance, the line that separates the two groups is not purely meritocratic or economic; instead, it is a matter of who is and who is not representative of the group.

### 2.3.3. Populist Leader

It is pretty explicit to this point that this operation requires a prominent figure who moves the masses, using patriotic roots and missing concepts, to unify “the people,” who breaks out of the patterns of domination and creates personal bonds, and who invests what it has available to gain political legitimacy. For Casullo (2019, Loc. 2125), “populism has been expressed through parties...” and “...leaderships”, perhaps referring to the particularity of doing politics according to its geographical context, although almost every time in the collective imagination, populism is linked to the figure of ‘the leader’ such as the symbol of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, in Italy to former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, and now to Giorgia Meloni, in Hungary to Viktor Orbán, or as it was in the USA with Donald Trump.

Briefly returning to the concept of “populist myth,” (Casullo, 2019) it should be added that the author talks about a dualistic hero conception. On one side, “the people” represents the collective character that, even though “cannot organize or act with a view to a long-term goal on his own...” is still considered a heroic faction. On the other side, “the populist leader who must accompany and guide them” (Casullo, 2019, Loc. 909) becomes the redeemer figure of “the people.” Yet, this actor is “an individual... mostly successful in specific societies...” that “mobilize the masses and/or conduct their parties with the aim of enacting radical reforms...” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 62) This statement suggests that victory depends on the reality and abilities the leader manifests to demonstrate himself as the only representative voice of “the people.”

For Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), the populist leader can simultaneously manifest as someone popularly strong but charismatic. Related to this, for Canovan (1999) and Weyland (2001), the presence of a charismatic leader is essential for this phenomenon. On the other hand, for Mudde (2004) and Rooduijn (2014) charisma is not a defining element. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) continues to say, the leader it may be someone who takes action, focused on being the proper connection and voice of “the people,” an entrepreneur, ethnic representative, but overall, someone extraordinary, which on many instances does not reflect the nation’s actual reality (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). It must be admitted that to study political management, other fields of research that focus on human behavior itself may be required. Even so, it is not difficult to demonstrate in political science studies that the populist leader seeks to charm, please, and captivate as many individuals as possible

based on some common element that afflicts them, generate empathy, and self-identify as the solution.

### 2.3.3.1. Defining Features of Populist Leaders

Up to this point, it can be understood that the recurring pattern in politics is the search for the exercise of power by an individual, which in populism is based on the support of a large number of followers -the people-to demonstrate with the collective desire, that it is necessary to get rid of elitist oppression (Mouffe, 2009). For that reason, below the features that shape populist actors are listed, to which we must pay special attention.

First is anti-elitism, an approach preferred by left-wing politicians without intending to exclude the other political factions, which is clearly identified as the actor condemning the ruling elites as a way of appealing to the people. This trademark facilitates the identification of populist candidates (Nai& Martínez, 2019), as explained by Canovan(2002) when she claims that “populists always attack the power elite of politicians and bureaucrats for their privileges, their corruption, and their lack of accountability to the people” (p. 32). This characteristic is also associated with anti-institutionalist marks in the populist discourse, referring to the direct attack that the actor has towards the media, political parties, and other institutions that separate them from “the people,” and therefore subtracting the power or control over this last group (Diehl, 2019, p. 125).

Second is people-centrism, due to a constant obsession with appealing to the people and winning their favor to become their representative, causing the populist discourse to seek the simplification of political reality. “For populists ‘the people’, considered as one homogenous whole, represent the focal point of democracy” (Jacobs et al. 2018). In Mudde’s (2004) vision, the populist figure should be a manifestation of “the people” and their voice, and this strong conviction that populist leaderhas as the voice of the people, makes populists look authentic and legitimate towards the corrupt group that has deceived the population.

Third is anti-pluralism, understood as the desire to define society in two opposite and homogeneous groups (Mudde, 2004), that is, you are black or white, but there is no room for gray shades. This characteristic certainly can go hand in hand with the previous one, because they complement each other; “In addition to being anti-elitist, populists are always anti-pluralist” (Müller, 2016, p. 101) although not all anti-pluralists are populists. The same author also alleges that this trait delegitimizes other political competitors and excludes from the people all those who support said opponents. In an attempt to concentrate the control, they have over their own group, “the people.”

Fourth is exclusionism, which is understood as the negativity that populist actors have towards other specific groups in society, in addition to the corrupt elite (Rooduijn, 2014). These other groups are not part of “the people,” generally for ethnic, religious,

sexual or economic reasons, such as immigrants and other minorities living in the same country (Panizza, 2005; Jagers&Walgrave, 2007; Albertazzi& McDonnell, 2008). Based on that, the “populists claim to defend the collective identity of the ‘true’ people against enemies from outside. It depends on the context whether the outsiders are immigrants, unemployed, or people of another religion or race” (Rooduijn, 2014, p. 576).

### 2.3.3.2. Three Types of Populist Leaders

Although not every political leader is a populist, every single populist actor has a minimum degree of charismatic leadership that gives meaning to this way of doing politics, regardless of whether, or not, this is an inherent attribute. Meaning that to a certain extent, the populist actor has a capability<sup>9</sup> to attract a susceptible group in a certain society, be it by his speeches, his personality, or even by his presence. Within the leadership vision, authors such as Mudde and RoviraKaltwasser (2017) separate the populist leaders as follows:

First, as an unusual group called the “True Outsiders” that “have no significant links to the elite ... build their career completely outside of the political mainstream... [and] are probably more successful in more personalized and fluid political systems... than in more institutionalized and established political systems...” (Mudde &RoviraKaltwasser, 2017, p. 75).For Casullo (2019), these are presented as someone who is not contaminated by the immorality of the establishment, who comes from abroad, and who entered the political scene almost by force to save “the people” from the suffering caused by the elites. Casullo (2019) additionally declares that “the factual truth underlying the leader’s self-presentation is secondary to the potency of the narrative of the personal journey from apolitical passivity to total redemptive commitment to the people” (Loc. 954). In this perspective, the outsider does not have commitments with any type of partners, rather he/she comes to power ‘free of debts.’ Among the outsiders we find styles such as the patriotic military exemplified by Hugo Chávez, social leaders such as Evo Morales and successful businessmen such as Donald Trump (Casullo, 2019).

Second, a successful group called the “insiders-outsiders” that despite not coming from the elite, are in constant contact with it (Mudde &RoviraKaltwasser, 2017). An example of this leadership came from Silvio Berlusconi, that “built his media empire through his special connection with Bettino Craxi, leader of the Italian Socialist Party and premier of Italy” (2017, p. 75).

Third, “the insiders” as can be deduced, this group is not only small but even a bit ambiguous to populist ideas, since it comes from a political elite, meaning that he/she has a career as a politician, (Mudde &RoviraKaltwasser, 2017) as is the case of

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<sup>9</sup>Charisma: the ability to attract the attention and admiration of others, and to be seen as a leader. Source: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/charisma>

Viktor Orbán in Hungary. With this explanation, it can be concluded that the populist leader's vision will depend pretty much on the context of his development within the society associated with him/her, and from what was expressed at the beginning of this section, charisma in its different degrees, guides this vision towards the desired route.

#### 2.4. The Cases for the Analysis

Using these fundamental concepts in a specific country-candidate context, can provide useful empirical for understanding the relevance of theoretical considerations in populism studies. For this purpose, two well-known cases with larger, global repercussions are chosen. These cases are Hugo Chávez from Venezuela and Donald Trump from United States of America.

First of all, it is unquestionable that the Hugo Chávez government really made an impact on Venezuelan political history and, at the same time, exceeded the limits of its borders. “No recent Venezuelan president ever had such a high international profile, that he went beyond the limits of the region to reach remote parts of the world...”<sup>10</sup>. “Indeed, Chávez was arguably the most quintessential populist figure Latin America had seen since Juan Perón, the legendary Argentine leader who was virtually synonymous with populism in the region” (Roberts, 2012, p. 136). It becomes clear to scholars that Chávez was a populist, particularly when his speeches are compared with clearly recognized past populist figures (Hurtado, 2015; Hawkins, 2009):

In Chávez's discursive practice, the process of constituting a political identity typical of populism is clearly appreciated. While he divides the social field into two antagonistic factions (people / oligarchy), he in parallel leaves open the possibility of regeneration, which is characteristic of any government with a hegemonic claim (like populists). In this sense, the borders that he establishes are porous, which is why he continually incorporates and expels his adversaries by accusing them of being traitors, of being an oligarchy that betrayed the Bolivarian dream and that threatens the interests of the people. He in turn makes calls for national unity, inviting his adversaries to work for the welfare of society as a whole (Hurtado, 2015, p. 58).

The eloquence and self-confidence of the former Venezuelan president are indications of his personality exposed without taboos or protocols in his public appearances, where he promoted his revolutionary leadership style. This power that Chávez exercised over the media earned him great support from hundreds of followers (Frajman, 2014). Although Chávez did not have a political career to “justify” his victory in 1999 -the year he came to power- by 2012; he managed to secure re-election for a fourth term where Venezuela's internal security and economic future were his main

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<sup>10</sup> BBC, (2012, up to date in 2013). Hugo Chávez, el hombre al que sólo derrotó el cáncer. Source: [www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2013/03/121210\\_obituario\\_hugo\\_chavez](http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2013/03/121210_obituario_hugo_chavez)

campaign concerns since the Latin American nation was struggling with recurrent scarcities of essential goods and the crime rate was everyday growing<sup>11</sup>.

Contrastingly, “Donald Trump stunned the political world in 2016 when he became the first person without government or military experience ever to be elected president of the United States of America. His four-year tenure in the White House revealed extraordinary fissures in American society but left little doubt that he is a figure unlike any other in the nation’s history” (Dimock & Gramlich, 2021, p. 1). Although the political power of this North American businessman was much less compared to other political leaders such as Chávez himself, for example, who already exercised a political dominance that allowed him to come to power in some way, Trump promoted the rise of a phenomenon; by mobilizing opposition masses like never before, speaking to them about the democratic force that apparently they were losing over the years and that he would bring back in order to make America powerful and “great again”.

Trump’s speeches as part of his incredibly expensive presidential campaign<sup>12</sup> apparently validated his capacity to exercise power, for instance, the authors Thiers and Wehner (2019) argue that Trump’s selective assault, similar to those of Chávez when he lashed out at “*el imperio*” to refer to the USA, also unified and accelerated the leader-people bond, which helped foster the fight against the influence of the elite. “The tariff policy of Trump toward China and his renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement tended to enhance his follower group’s morale—as did the slogans “America First” and “Make America Great Again” (Thiers & Wehner, 2019, p. 9). It is also clear to other scholars (Hidalgo, 2021; Oliver & Rahn, 2016) that Trump fits within the populist framework, due to the traces he leaved in his allocutions.

This contextualization persists in showing that the phenomenon in question is difficult to understand since it can change depending on multiple factors, such as the political, geographical, and cultural context or the situation of the candidates concerning political ideologies. As evidenced throughout this chapter, scholars insist on explaining the attributes to identify populist figures over and over again, without digging into “hows.” This study does not intend to affirm again that Trump and Chávez are populists; the constant use of these examples in other works already highlights this affair; instead, it seeks to show how it is possible, taking into account all the surrounding factors, that populists connect so strongly with parts of society -commonly attached to “the people” concept- until achieving their massive and unconditional support. That support allows them to win the race to occupy the highest political position in a nation. Following that reasoning and considering that there is few existing research (Diehl, 2019; Casullo, 2019; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017) around the link between the populist leader and “the people”, the present research will address this significant aspect of populist policies through a comparative method.

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<sup>11</sup> Timeline: Venezuela’s Chavez Era. Source: <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/venezuelas-chavez-era>

<sup>12</sup> \$6.5 billion for the presidential and congressional elections combined, according to campaign finance watchdog OpenSecrets.org Source: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/04/14/somebody-just-put-a-price-tag-on-the-2016-election-its-a-doozy/>

### 3. METHODOLOGY

The aim of this research is to analyze how the connection between the populist leader and the people is effectively built. This chapter seeks to explain the method for this analysis, which is content analysis from the directed approach. The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section explains the choice for a qualitative analysis. The second section explains the comparative method, after that, the third and last section focused on explaining the data analysis procedures, under directed content analysis guidelines.

#### 3.1. The Preference for Qualitative Analysis

The qualitative method is used in this research because the qualitative method “studies reality in its natural context, just as it happens, trying to make sense of or interpret phenomena according to the meanings they have for the people involved...” (Flores, et al., 1996, p. 10). Moreover, the qualitative method comprehensively analyzes the social actor from a human understanding of himself (Stake, 2007), a perspective based on Max Weber’s thoughts that the subject can interpret social action within its own context (2005). Clearly, the decision to opt for this research method arises from the need to explain the operating procedures of populist leader to build a connection with “the people”. Also, in the need to rely on a system of understanding, that can define and guide the selection (Greener, 2018) of “a great variety of materials... that describe the routine, the problematic situations and the meanings...” (Flores et al., 1996, p.10) of the populist leader-people bond.

Taking into account that, “the concepts, hypotheses, and theories in qualitative studies are explanations of what we have faced, examined, analyzed, and evaluated in depth. [and that] The theory emanates from the experiences of the participants and is based on the data...” (Hernández, et al., 2014, p. 483). Indeed, the qualitative analysis in this research became a “dynamic and creative process” (Taylor, et al., 2016, p. 169) that was fed, fundamentally, from the direct journey with the explored scenarios. The focal point of this analysis was inductive since it was tried to build an interpretation of how the leader-people bond is constructed through observation and exploration of populist electoral speeches.

This study, which considers the populist leader-people bond, has an interpretative proposal. It is for this reason that it is essential to work with a methodology of qualitative approaches. This work does not ignore the valuable contributions that have been made on the subject with other methodologies, but it does seek to broaden the field of study methodologically as well. Considering that “it is not possible to achieve perfect reliability if we are to produce meaningful studies of the real world” (Taylor et al., 2016, p. 10-11) since this type of evaluation is linked to flaws of “human judgment” (LaPiere, 2010, p. 11), This thesis focused on validating the research through a continuous approach to the data and a consistent exposition of the findings. It should be said that the qualitative methods do underline the *validity* of the outcomes

since “the qualitative researcher obtains firsthand knowledge of social life unfiltered...” (Taylor et al., 2016, p. 10). As a qualitative researcher, it was important to seek “validity through personalized, intimate understandings of the social phenomena, stressing ‘close in’ observations to achieve ‘factual, reliable, and confirmable’ data” (Rist, 1997, p. 46). To achieve this effectively, a certain critical judgment was required to distinguish the data that would constitute the main source of the theorization of populist leader-people bond, from those that would only provide complementary information.

### 3.2. The Comparative Method

Within the framework of the populist phenomenon, it can be thought that the leader-people connection differs according to the area conditions and particular characteristics of the respective nations. For this reason, these two unlike populist leaders from two unlike countries are used. From the country’s point of view Venezuela and the USA are different not only in size, power, wealth but among other things, they differ in democracy management. Methodologically, the choice of these specific cases goes along with the Most Different System Design or MDS by its initials. (Przeworski&Teune, 1970, p. 34-46). For the MDS the plan is to select “units of research which are as different as possible with regard to extraneous variables. The basic logic is that differences cannot explain similarities.” (Carsten, 2008, p. 390). That is why, the selected cases qualify for an MDS since they have different background situations (Trump: well-known and wealthy family; Chávez: lower class family), political [parties] orientation (Trump: right; Chávez: left), political and professional preparation (Trump: businessman with no background in politics; Chávez: former military officer with political experience that began after his attempted coup in 1992).

Although both reached the presidency without ever having held a political position, in the case of Chávez for this study, he was already in power for the third consecutive term, thus at this point in 2012, he did have a political career.<sup>13</sup> Last but not least, Chávez and Trump come not only from different cultures, received education in different educational systems, speak different languages, but the role for which they contend, although in theory it is the same, being president in the USA, the first world power, is not the same than being president of a smaller, less populated and less developed country like Venezuela.<sup>14</sup> The use of these two different cases is clearly out of a desire to explain a relationship that builds and solidifies, seemingly regardless of circumstances. If not, how can we explain that these organisms, which differ from each other, ended up with the same result? a populist figure seizing power.

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<sup>13</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2016/09/02/espanol/america-latina/chavez-y-trump-la-politica-del-espectaculo.html>

<sup>14</sup> <https://datacommons.org/place/country/VEN>

<https://datacommons.org/place/country/USA>

### 3.3. Content Analysis

This study employs content analysis as its method. Among existing different types of such analysis, the present study utilizes the directed approach proposed by Hsieh and Shannon (2005), which aims to validate the existing theory and enlarge the conceptual material that is available in this regard. Content analysis has been defined as a non-rigorous method that leads to a plain explanation of the data, that “allows the researcher to test theoretical issues” (Cavanagh, 1997, p. 5) to facilitate the interpretation of the information. According to Mayring (2000) content analysis is “an approach of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts...” (p. 2). Patton (2002) describes this method as “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort...” (p. 453). Alternatively, for Marradi and his collaborators (2007), content analysis is “a technique of interpreting texts...” (p. 290). In this study, Hsieh and Shannon’s (2005) approach that regards content analysis as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data...” (p. 1278) is adopted. The authors argue that content analysis requires a process of “systematic classification of coding and identification of themes or patterns” executed through a conventional, directed, or summative approach. The directed content analysis approach “makes explicit the reality that researchers are unlikely to be working from the native perspective...” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283) which allowed to face the challenges to explain the populist leader and people connection. In this approach of content analysis, even having a support in the existing theory, the codes not only come from the data, but they can also be defined during the process of data analysis. Table 3.1 below shows the main features of directed content analysis, while it also shows its differences from other qualitative content analysis approaches proposed by Hsieh and Shannon (2005).

**Table 3.1** Major Coding Differences Among Three Approaches to Content Analysis

<i>Type of Content Analysis</i>	<i>Study Starts With</i>	<i>Timing of Defining Codes or Keywords</i>	<i>Source of Codes or Keywords</i>
Conventional content analysis	Observation	Codes are defined during data analysis	Codes are derived from data
Directed content analysis	Theory	Codes are defined before and during data analysis	Codes are derived from theory or relevant research findings
Summative content analysis	Keywords	Keywords are identified before and during data analysis	Keywords are derived from interest of researchers or review of literature

Note. From “Three approaches to qualitative content analysis.” by Hsieh, H. F., & Shannon, S. E., 2005, *Qualitative health research*, 15(9), p. 1286. Copyright 2005 by Sage Publications.

Bearing this in mind, the selection of Chávez’s and Trump’s electoral speeches was analyzed along with the theory presented in the literature review chapter. In this process, emerging patterns were identified, which were clustered into categories and subcategories. This categorization was done inductively, after detecting those patterns and their respective variations within a time frame. As proposed and explained by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) grouping those patterns into categories helped to establish styles or tendencies that allowed identifying meanings, and thus being able to interpret them (Patton, 2002). Although it is not necessary to exclude deductive reasoning, as Patton suggests (2002, p. 55-58), this type of analysis implies a process of inductive reasoning by the researcher where the information is examined and compared in detail. It was thanks to this procedure that the categorization and subcategorization of the data effectively occurred (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009).

### 3.3.1. Unit of Analysis

In this study, the unit of analysis<sup>15</sup> is the 2012 and 2016 electoral campaign speeches of Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump respectively.

### 3.3.2. Sample Selection

Whitin the first “current flow of activities” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 10) it was essential to select the relevant samples for the analysis, these were videos of Chávez’s and Trump’s electoral campaign speeches. That previous selection of samples allowed the “Data reduction”, which is later renamed as “data condensation” (Miles & Huberman, 2014, p. 12). This procedure aimed at the compression of the samples, resulting in eighteen [18] of the three hundred and thirty-seven [337] Chávez’s and Trump’s electoral campaign speeches identified. That procedure of reduction was necessary to finally analyze the material through the elaboration of summaries, codifications, list of topics, classifications, among others. Although the selection and condensation of data seems to be a process that exceeds the analysis, Miles and Huberman (2014) emphasize this process’s importance as a crucial part of the analysis itself. It is about embracing that first experience with the data, to make it narrower but substantial at the same time.

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<sup>15</sup> Considering what the authors (Taylor, et al., 2016; Merriam, 2009; Valles, 1999; Erlandson, et al., 1993) say about visual material as units of analysis.

The sample frame considered all existing Chávez and Trump speeches prior to 2012 Venezuelan and 2016 American presidential elections. In the case of Hugo Chávez, although the presidential campaign for the period 2013-2019 in Venezuela lasted only three months (July - October 2012), the appearances of the already president of the South American country at that time, were already recurrent<sup>16</sup>. By March of 2012, Chávez was officially announcing his candidacy for the elections to be held later in October. Thus, the period chosen to take the samples for this research covers an interval of 6 months prior to the day of the Venezuelan presidential elections in 2012. In the case of Donald Trump, whose campaign lasted about 4 months<sup>17</sup> from its launch to the elections, he was traveling around the country promoting his politic program long before the primary elections in the North American country. This is why, Trump's sample selection also covers a period of 6 months leading up to the 2016 presidential election.

For Chávez, a total of 126 speeches were counted, including some press conferences where he took control and made those events unidirectional moments. The final selection of the speeches for the analysis was made randomly in reference to the dates they were broadcast. These speeches being: two in March, one in April, one in June, one in July, one in August, one in September and two in October of 2012. Yet they were intentionally included into the final list:(a) the announcement and inscription of Chávez candidacy speech to detect deliberate approaches towards a leader-people bond; and (b) the victory speech, to observe the reactions and possible new promises of the candidate, to consolidate the leader-people bond. The other samples included in the final list for analysis were selected in order to cover the range of months dedicated to this research. In this way, it was also possible to detect in the selected speeches the recurrence of patterns that Chávez used to persuade and build the leader-people bond, from beginning to end. In addition to answering questions such as: what changed in Chávez's narrative? what was added to that narrative? what was subtracted from that narrative? All regarding ways to approach and influence "the people" within that timeline.

Correspondingly, for Trump, a total of 211 speeches were counted, including three presidential debates, in which his interventions were seriously considered. Since these formal discussions are usually moments of direct questions that are made to the candidates to find out their government plans, their position on controversial issues or previous policies, and to have a clear vision of the government ideology that these candidates intend to implement in the country. Like his Venezuelan peer, the final selection of Trump's speeches included:(a) the announcement and acceptance of the candidacy speeches, and (b) the victory speech. Being the final selection of the speeches: one in April, one in June, one in July, two in August, one in September, one in October and two in November of 2016. With this selection of Trump's speeches, it

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<sup>16</sup> During Venezuela's three-month electoral campaign, President Hugo Chávez has appeared eight times longer on television than his opposition rival, has accelerated his social plans and delivered more homes than ever before. Source: <https://www.reuters.com/article/portada-elecciones-venezuela-campaa-idLTASIE88R07420120928>

<sup>17</sup> He declared his candidacy on June 16, 2015, and officially received the nomination of the Republican Party on July 19, 2016, at the Republican National Convention. Source: [https://ballotpedia.org/Donald\\_Trump\\_presidential\\_campaign,\\_2016](https://ballotpedia.org/Donald_Trump_presidential_campaign,_2016)

was tried to cover the months allocated to the investigation with the objective of understanding how Trump managed to build a connection with the American people.

For both cases of analysis, a list type table was made (See APPENDIX 1). That list includes electoral speeches and some other exceptions of verbal exchange nature. The exceptions were: three press conferences in Chávez’s speeches directory, and three debates in Trump’s speeches directory. It should be noted that other public appearances of Chávez and Trump in interviews, video blogs, televised telephone contacts, short statements, some press conferences, among others, such as social media posts made on Chávez’s and Trump’s personal accounts, were excluded from this list. After grouping all the Chávez’s and Trump’s speeches on that table list and given that both cases exceeded one hundred speeches in total, the final selection of speeches for analysis was made from that list. This reduction procedure tried to cover the initial, middle and last part of Chávez’s and Trump’s race for the presidency of their respective countries (*see table 3.2*).

Accordingly, after the “data reduction” (Miles & Huberman, 2014, p. 12) of thenine [9] Chávez’s 2012 electoral campaign speeches, and nine [9] Trump’s 2016 electoral campaign speeches, these were detected in web archives, transcribed as spoken, and ordered by broadcast date. The transcription process lasted between 4 to 5 months. The eighteen speeches’ transcripts were later included separately, with an index for easier navigation within all the speeches, inside the journal of this thesis.

**Table 3.2** Hugo Chávez 2012, and Donald Trump 2016 speeches sample selection

<i>Date</i>	<i>Hugo Chávez</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Donald Trump</i>
3/16/2012	Speech - Caracas Int. Airpot	4/27/2016	Speech - Foreing Policy - Washintong DC
3/17/2012	Speech - Annoucement of the candidacy - Vargas	6/22/2016	Speech - The stakes of the election - NY
4/30/2012	Speech - New Labor Law - Caracas	7/21/2016	Speech - Rep. Nomination Acceptance - OH
6/11/2012	Speech - Inscription of the candidacy - DC	8/15/2016	Speech with Mike Pence - Understanding the threat - Youngstown, OH

7/26/2012	Speech - El valle, DC	8/31/2016	Speech - Immigration - Phoenix
8/17/2012	Speech - San Agustin, DC	9/22/2016	Speech - Plan for American Energy - Pittsburg
9/15/2012	Speech - San Fernando, Apure	10/19/2016	Debate #3
10/4/2012	Speech - CampaingClousure - Caracas, DC	11/7/2016	Speech - Grand Rapids
10/7/2012	Victory Speech	11/9/2016	Victory Speech

Note. Six-month range speeches selection previous to the election day on each case. Source: own elaboration.

These speeches are available on the Internet. Indeed, internet “...provide[s] another important source of data... [since videos] many official records and public documents are readily available to researchers, and the availability of documents is increasing with the growth of online archives...” (Taylor, et al., 2016, p. 152). For this study, initially official websites of both governments and the main mass media were acknowledged and inspected. After this, the video material according to the sample selection of Chávez’s and Trump’s electoral speeches was identified on *@FactbaseVideos*<sup>18</sup>, *@donaldtrumplivespeechesral7566*<sup>19</sup> YouTube channels for Trump Speeches, and *@VideosPPresiden*<sup>20</sup>, *@telesurtv*<sup>21</sup> YouTube channels for Chávez Speeches, as well as on others online collections of political content.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/@FactbaseVideos/videos>

<sup>19</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/@donaldtrumplivespeechesral7566>

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/@VideosPPresiden>

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/@telesurtv>

<sup>22</sup> (a) <https://archive.org/details/trumparchive?and%5B%5D=year%3A%222016%22&and%5B%5D=subject%3A%22donald+trump%22&sort=-publicdate&page=7>

(b) [https://archive.org/search.php?query=Hugo+Chavez&sin=&and\[\]=subject%3A%22hugo+chavez%22](https://archive.org/search.php?query=Hugo+Chavez&sin=&and[]=subject%3A%22hugo+chavez%22)

(c) <https://www.youtube.com/@mariogonzalezortega/videos> -and- <https://www.youtube.com/@misionchavezandanga/videos>

**3.3.2.1. Approaching the Data**

From the *sampleselection* section forward, the first of the three essential moments proposed by Taylor and his collaborators (2016) was followed. That moment is called “discovery”<sup>23</sup> (Taylor, et al., 2016, p. 184) and together with the other two<sup>24</sup> moments it contains several actions that seek the development of a deep understanding of the scenarios or people being studied, and which were considered when triggering this investigation on populist leader-people bond. Yet again, it can be noticed how the discovery part is the first and fundamental of the actions within an investigation. As challenging as it may seem, it was pondered by Taylor and his collaborators (2016) that exceeding this level may be the key to success in coding. Therefore, to explore all possible aspects regarding populist leader-people bond, “field notes, transcripts, documents and other materials” were collected, and then read and reread carefully. All the speeches were studied in detail.

The approximation “to the data, [was made] to develop an empathetic understanding of the observed, to be able to interpret and describe the constructions of reality as seen by the subjects, and to be able to articulate an inter-subjectivity with regard to the phenomenon being studied” (Rist, 1997, p. 45). That effort to “know the data inside and out” (Taylor et al, 2016, p. 170) through reading and a reflective approach, encouraged to keep track of the interpretations and ideas that arose at the time. This in turn helped to visualize reoccurring themes on Chávez’s and Trump’s narrative style, build typologies, develop some initial concepts about the populist leader-people bond, return to the literature, start building the first sketches of the diagrams and write analytical thoughts in the journal of this thesis. All this was carried out as follows the *table 3.3* proposed by Taylor and his collaborators (2016). To this point the authors cited, are very clear in stating that there is no easy way, or shortcut, to arrive at a “correct” development of concepts, hence categorizations. Though they do offer those valuable suggestions on actions to create valuable ideas, that made this first step less overwhelming.

**Table 3.3** Developing Themes and Concepts

<i>Moment</i>	<i>Actions</i>
	Read and reread your data
	Keep track of hunches, interpretations, and ideas

<sup>23</sup> Where “researchers gradually make sense of what they are studying by combining insight and intuition with an intimate familiarity with the data”.

<sup>24</sup> Being *coding* the second, referring to “a way of developing and refining interpretations of the data”; and *discounting data* the third one, referring to “interpreting data in the context in which they were collected” (Taylor et al, 2016, pp. 170, 181, 188).

Discovery	Look for themes that occur frequently
	Construct typologies
	Develop concepts and theoretical propositions
	Read the literature
	Develop charts, diagrams, and figures.
	Write analytical memos

Note. Adapted from “Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods. A Guidebook and Resource” (4th ed., p. 171) by Taylor, S. J., Bogdan, R., & DeVault, M., 2016, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. Copyright 2016 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc

### 3.3.3. Coding

#### 3.3.3.1 The Coding Frame

For the coding frame of this investigation the steps suggested by Taylor and his collaborators (2016) were followed as indicated in *Table 3.4*. Part of this process began with the decision for the study sample, described in the previous section. The re-reading of the transcripts of Chávez’s and Trump’s electoral campaign speeches was done intentionally. Research ideas began to make sense, especially after having organized the data and having made some decisions to pursue in the analysis. Afterward, it was thought once again about the question that this research tries to solve: How the populist leader-people bond is formed?

**Table 3.4** Steps in Coding

<i>Moment</i>	<i>Actions</i>
Open Coding	Read and reread the data, noting possible themes
	Consider various ways of labeling and organizing bits of data
	Make preliminary decisions about lines of analysis to pursue
Focused	Develop a story line
	List all major themes, typologies, concepts, and propositions
	Develop codes

Coding	Sort your data into codes
	Compare the data and refine your analysis

Note. Adapted from “Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods. A Guidebook and Resource” (4th ed., p. 181) by Taylor, S. J., Bogdan, R., & DeVault, M., 2016, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. Copyright 2016 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc

Considering the research question and previous steps regarding the data analysis, a new reading of the transcripts was made while watching the videos of the selection of Chávez’s and Trump’s electoral campaign speeches. In that procedure, each statement said by Chávez and Trump that seemed relevant to the leader-people bond construction, was highlighted. At this point a manual draft layout of the major themes was prepared. (See APPENDIX 2 and APPENDIX 3). Based on the lists of major themes that were generated by observing the electoral campaign speeches of Chávez and Trump, the codes were developed, grouped into clusters, and with the help and several attempts of “tree diagrams”(Morse & Field, 1995), finally those codes were organized and framed within categories. Once within the categories, the codes were separated by theme patterns and relocated in subcategories.

For this research, the arrangement of the data into codes was done manually. Originally three major groups of codes were created. In the event that the contents did not fit into the categories/subcategories where they were originally placed, it was thought of creating new categories/subcategories or relocating that content into another existing category. Subsequently, with the analysis of these first group of categories, it was observed that two other new categories could be formed. That was how the final classification was reached, although the names and position of subcategories and codes were changing during the research process as well. After re-evaluating the final group of categories, these were identified within the transcriptions of Chávez’s and Trump’s electoral campaign speeches with a color scheme, which are: yellow, pink, green, blue and red. This procedure made it easier to locate the examples.

### 3.3.4.2. The Coding Process


In relation to the final definition of the major classifications, it was established a categorical design process, which was carried out as follows: (see Figure 3.1)

1. Sample selection study: once the unit of analysis was selected<sup>25</sup> a timeline was generated. From that timeline a sample of the beginning, middle, and end of Hugo Chávez’s and Donald Trump’s, respectively electoral campaigns, was selected. With this final sample selection, it was proceeded to analyze them, as the first step in the coding process.

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<sup>25</sup> Chávez’s and Trump’s electoral campaign speeches

2. Derivation of the categories: in this procedure, the most significant elements regarding populist leader-people bond were recognized inside Chávez’s and Trump’s speeches. This procedure was carried out through an inferential effort from the audiovisual material review and transcription of Chávez’s and Trump’s electoral campaign speeches. It was also inductive because it was in this process that the first categories arose.



**Figure 3.1** Categorical process<sup>26</sup>

3. Tree diagram creation: here the categories were clustered into conceptual families on a tree diagram. The names of these groups were adopted according to the topics emerging from the patterns of Chávez’s and Trump’s narratives. These patterns significantly support central ideas extracted from each of Chávez’s and Trump’s speeches. Subsequently, the ideas were arranged within these topics in subcategories and codes.

4. Category authentication: using the tree diagram and after a period of time-out, a re-categorization of the major themes was made. This process was done with the aim of evidencing ideas consistent with the leader-people bond construction. This step is summarized as a re-interpretative moment of the classifications.

5. Derivation of topics: the final ideas were framed, and a set of central and secondary themes clarified. The clarification process was due to the singularity of the themes and their level of frequency, that in turn allowed the recognition of Chávez’s and Trump’s narratives towards the leader-people bond construction.

<sup>26</sup> This setup is part of the qualitative analysis process. Source: own elaboration

## 4. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

In this chapter, the coding findings of Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump electoral campaign speeches analysis will be presented as follows: addressing the appearance of main large categories, which in turn break down distinctive subcategories between Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump. Once the categories and subcategories have been identified, it will proceed to explain them one by one. In each section explaining the categories, they are also compared between the two candidates: Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump. Examples in both cases will be offered to support the results of this research on the leader-people bond.


### 4.1. Sample Selection Coding Procedure Findings

#### 4.1.1. Chávez's Speeches: Coding Process

After the exhaustive reading of the transcripts of Chávez's 2012 electoral campaign speeches, at least five categories were derived in reference to the mechanism to persuade and connect with the people as a leader. These are Chávez's construction of himself as "the leader", his non-verbal communication capability,<sup>27</sup> the construction of "the real people" in Venezuelan context, the identification of a crisis, and the mobilization of the people. Subcategories and codes are derived from these main categories. The codes are patterns since each of those codes responds to the performance of each subcategory (see figure 4.1). In these patterns, it will be exposed how the success of Chávez's leader-people bond was driven by a narrative that gave "the people" a real or imaginary place in Venezuelan society. Until that moment "the people" were a group of citizens "not considered" by the previous Venezuelan governments to participate in politics. Those former politicians had taken away the people's capability to exercise their power in the political arena. Popular power is a key point in Chavist politics.

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<sup>27</sup> This category arose from the observation of the video files, evidencing a limitation for this research by not being able to carry out a comprehensive study of this mechanism, using a field of study specialized in corporal expressions. "As for current trends in body language studies, disciplines like linguistics, sociology, psychology and anthropology have shaped nonverbal studies to a great extent." (Hişmanoğlu and Hişmanoğlu, 2008, p. 167)



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
Figure 4.1 Tree diagram of Hugo Chávez 2012 speeches<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> The main categories are in gray, the subcategories in blue and the codes in green. Source: own elaboration

#### 4.1.2. Trump's Speeches: Coding Process

The transcripts of Trump's 2016 electoral campaign speeches were likewise thoroughly reviewed, read, and analyzed. After that process five strong categories emerged, referring to mechanisms the leader uses to persuade and to connect with the people. These are: Trump's construction of himself as "the leader", non-verbal communication, the construction of the people within the North American context, a crisis identification, and the mobilization of people. Like its Venezuelan counterpart, subcategories and codes were derived from these main categories (See figure 4.2). Here the category of non-verbal communication, although its use was not very notorious as in the case of Hugo Chávez, faced the same limitation exposed in the Chávez case. After the analysis carried out to decipher the construction of the leader-people bond in the cases of Chávez and Trump, almost exact similarities were found in terms of the mechanisms of persuasion in the rhetoric used by the two leaders. Even when we see that the main categorizations are identical in both Chávez and Trump cases, actually, their foundations which in this case are the patterns present in the different subcategories, clearly differ from each other. This may happen due to the cultural, social, and economic context of each candidate, as discussed in the previous chapter.

Up to this point, it should be clarified that the five main categories do not appear in a specific order. Neither are presented in this study with a special order as well. They simply occur throughout the analysis of the transcriptions and reproductions of the speeches. That is why for the purposes of this explanation the aforementioned main categories will follow the order shown on the tree diagrams. First, from upper left to right (referring to figures 4.1 and 4.2), both candidates were working on building their own image as leaders. Trump and Chávez built the image of the ideal leader for each of the cases, regardless of whether they were needed or not. Second, the two candidates convey non-verbal messages. Third, although all citizens of a nation may be considered the people, both Chávez and Trump created the ideal concept of a people, a true people, whom they selected as their target. Fourth, Chávez and Trump exposed crises in scenarios where only the previously created concept of leader is fit to solve those problems. Fifth, they aimed at a mobilization of the people to solidify the leader-people bond.



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Figure 4.2 Tree diagram of Donald Trump 2016 speeches<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> The main categories are in gray, the subcategories in blue and the codes in green. Source: own elaboration

## 4.2. Self-Construction as “The Leader”

### 4.2.1. Hugo Chávez

Chávez based the construction of his leader image, largely on spiritual and religious conceptions. He knew that he was trying to win the favor of a highly Catholic people, and other Christians in general. Chávez used his faith to touch the fibers of all believers and demonstrated his belief in God’s miracles, in a time when he was also dealing with an aggressive cancer.<sup>30</sup> At different times during his public appearances along the year, Chávez asked God for life, to continue ruling and assisting his country; an approach that can also be translated into generating a connection through pity: “My God! Give me strength, give me life, give me health to continue serving this people that I love more than my own life....” (Chávez, 2012).<sup>31</sup>

Chávez was very clear that most of the Venezuelan people, or at least the ones he wanted to reach, had knowledge of the symbols, stories, rituals, and principles of Catholicism. He was aware of the ignorance and lack of education of the vast majority too, regarding to the study and knowledge of the catholic Bible. Chávez used many Bible stories, verses, and “words of Jesus” to support his own doctrines. The clearest example was his reference to the beatitude,<sup>32</sup> where Jesus refers to people as they are spiritually poor. Here Chávez intentionally interprets and shares that “poor” in that biblical verse is denoting scarcity of what is necessary to survive, or denoting the lowest position in society. “My Lord we are fulfilling your mandate, my Christ: ‘Blessed are the poor because theirs will be the Kingdom of Heaven’...” (Chávez, 2012).<sup>33</sup> While repeating it on several occasions, Chávez omitted the terms “in spirit,” that followed the word “poor” in the original biblical verse (see footnote 32). This in turn caused a misinterpretation of the biblical quotation. Chávez was trying to show an image of compassion towards the poor people, so he sought to be his messiah, but to be their “spiritual” guide and voice. “There was no escape” for Venezuelans who shared his same faith. Getting along with him seemed natural and right, and that may be precisely what he wanted. Chávez’s narrative is full of phrases that denote closeness between him and the people. It is abundant with informality, spontaneity, colloquialism, folklore, and other marks that only a Venezuelan could translate. He chose to use that approach to finish building his own image as the leader. Chávez carried the children in his arms and

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<sup>30</sup> If Chávez survives cancer, political analysts say his increasing religiosity could pay election-year dividends in a country where Catholicism remains influential. Source: <https://www.foxnews.com/world/battling-cancer-socialist-leader-hugo-chavez-finds-religion>

<sup>31</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez’s speeches, p. 201

<sup>32</sup> “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven”  
Source: <https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Mateo+5%3A3&version=ESV>

<sup>33</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC02] MARCH 17, 2012 - SPEECH - ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANDIDACY - VARGAS. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez’s speeches, p. 21

talked to them in the middle of his speeches. He made jokes or got angry in front of everyone and had no formal code when it came expressing whatever his emotion was in that moment. Chávez literally became one of “them” -the people- to be able to foment a transformation, using values and patriotic symbols as a shield, to then volunteer to lead the modern Venezuelan revolution.

Within this category, Chávez includes his own personal struggles and the simplicity of being someone like anyone else. Someone who came out from “the people” group and therefore understands the context and needs of his fellow citizens. Here Chávez builds his own leader image by giving merits to himself. He drew a figure of a messianic leader knowing his public audience.<sup>34</sup> This is how the first subcategory appeared, which is identified as: *religious concepts*. There were found constant personifications<sup>35</sup> by taking concrete elements of God’s divinity, such as omnipresence:

(1) Beloved Venezuelan people, soldiers of the entire country, girls and boys of Venezuela, men and women of this land, workers, workers, heroic youth, students, peasants, indigenous brothers, this new return, in this case, today, March 16, after 21 days of absence from Venezuelan territory, physical absence because I have always been here with you in my heart, in my mind, in my soul, in all my being, together with you.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>36</sup>

As a messianic representation, as someone almost “divine” sent to save the Venezuelan people from evil:

(2) As a Christian, in Christ my Commander I put my life and I ask for my life to serve the people of Christ, the people of God, the people of the most suffered, the suffering people, the neediest, because that is our mission to serve everyone. and to all, but above all to the most needy people and that is the essence of the Socialist Revolution.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>37</sup>

Chávez consciously used metaphors of all kinds but did not waste any moment to use rhetoric of a religious nature:

(3) To overthrow the government that had installed.... I am going to paraphrase Jesus my Lord, it will be easier for a hundred horses

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<sup>34</sup> According to government estimates, the population is 92 percent Catholic, at least nominally.  
Source: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/132758.pdf>

<sup>35</sup> The act of giving a human quality or characteristic to something which is not human...  
Source: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/personification>

<sup>36</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC01] MARCH 16, 2012 - SPEECH - CARACAS INT. AIRPOT.  
Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez’s speeches, p. 2

<sup>37</sup> \_\_ [HC02] MARCH 17, 2012 - SPEECH - ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANDIDACY - VARGAS. \_\_ p. 14

to pass through the eye of a needle for the Venezuelan bourgeoisie to rule Venezuela again.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>38</sup>

Chávez continually plead before his supporters to have divine approval to rule:

(4) With this rain of *San Francisco* we consider ourselves blessed by the hand of God, of Christ the Redeemer, the holy water of San Francisco has fallen on us, that is a prelude to what will happen on Sunday, October 7.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>39</sup>

Chávez proved his experience in Catholic religion and knowledge of the Bible:

(5) Venezuelan people. I want to, a believer as I have been since I was a child, a believer, with great faith in the just God, the God of the just, in the God of the peoples, in the true God, and in Christ his son our Father; I want to infinitely thank God, in Christ made man, made a martyr, for the poor of the Earth, Christ and his sacrifices, and his example and his blood for the liberation of man; I want to thank my lord, humbly as a son, for being here today. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>40</sup>

(6) This morning we were praying, we were praying as a family, and someone was reading a psalm, the word of Christ, the word of Christ. "I have come, said Christ, to bring the good news, the liberation of the oppressed." (Chávez, 2012)<sup>41</sup>

(7) a Venezuela without misery, where we all live with dignity as brothers, as sisters, my Lord would say, our Lord Christ Redeemer of the peoples. Blessed are the peoples, the poor. Blessed are those who suffer today, said Christ. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>42</sup>

(8) This morning I was signing some letters there in Havana, and among them, I signed one for His Eminence the Cardinal of Havana and another for the Most Reverend and Most Excellent Apostolic Nuncio of His Holiness the Pope, accredited to the Cuban government. I did it in gratitude for a holy mass that the two of them conducted several days ago, together with the Cuban people, together with the Venezuelan-Cuban peoples, *compañeros, compañeras*, [female and male mates] asking God, Jesus for my health, the Virgin of Charity of *Cobre*, Cuban patron saint, to the Virgin of *Coromoto*, Venezuelan patron saint, and there I said goodbye to these two eminent men of our church, with that

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<sup>38</sup>Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 103

<sup>39</sup> \_\_ [HC08] OCTOBER 4, 2012 - SPEECH - CAMPAING CLOUSURE - CARACAS, DC. \_\_ p. 227

<sup>40</sup> \_\_ [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. \_\_ p. 48

<sup>41</sup> \_\_ [HC01] MARCH 16, 2012 - SPEECH - CARACAS INT. AIRPOT. \_\_ p. 6

<sup>42</sup> \_\_ [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. \_\_ p. 121

phrase, very, very of the sacred word, with Christ with him and in him, we will live and we will conquer. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>43</sup>

Chávez demonstrated use of what he considered “Christian values and philosophy”:

(9) What is the greatest spiritual basis of socialism? Love, that is why I am a Christian as I say, I have always believed it, that true Christianity is the same original project of socialism and that Christ our Lord was, I say so and I believe it, I believe it and I say it, one of the greatest socialists in our history, he came here to this earth to preach love “love one another” and that is only possible in socialism, capitalism sows hate, in capitalism hate prevails.... We have to preach by example, with the moral and spiritual values of socialism, of humanism, those of us who are Christians of true Christianity; and with those values, with that supreme inspiration to build in Venezuela (Chávez, 2012)<sup>44</sup>

Chávez used symbolism to associate important figures of the country with ideas typical of the Catholic faith. In this way he continued to build the image of a leader who gives importance to the history and traditions of the Venezuelan people:

(10) Oh Bolivar! Bolívar was like a Christ, see? Bolívar was like a Christ. We have finished the Farruco’s<sup>45</sup> mausoleum, soon, soon we will take the remains of our Father Bolívar to the new Bolivarian mausoleum, we will see, in a few days we will hold the event, right there in the National Pantheon, but we are going to put him up there , a tremendous, very modern mausoleum, to pay special honors to our father, the father of the people, the father of the Nation, the father of this Revolution, the father of this socialist project: Simón Bolívar, our father, infinite father. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>46</sup>

Chávez’s speeches present a large number of faith demonstration and “Christian devotion” marks. He used common phrases like: “thank God” or thanking the saints of the Catholic Church:

(11) So, I say it today, with Christ with him and in him, we will live, and we will win, and we will make the dream of Jesus come true, the project of Jesus my commander here on earth. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC01] MARCH 16, 2012 - SPEECH - CARACAS INT. AIRPOT. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez’s speeches, pp. 2-3

<sup>44</sup> [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. \_\_ pp. 71-72

<sup>45</sup> Farruco Sesto, the minister of state responsible for the transformation of greater Caracas.... Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/21/bolivar-tomb-chavez>

<sup>46</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez’s speeches, p. 6

<sup>47</sup>Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC01] MARCH 16, 2012 - SPEECH - CARACAS INT. AIRPOT. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez’s speeches, p. 3

(12) These are not easy days, but we are warriors to face adversity and with faith in God, in Christ the Redeemer and with that immense love of the Venezuelan people and with this will to live, to fight, to live and to win, we will get ahead. We will get ahead; we will live, and we will win.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>48</sup>

(13) I ask God... Thank you my God, Christ of the mountain, Christ of February 4, there you are, Christ of April 11, Christ of always, Christ of the peoples... God's blessed land... For that, thank you, my God, thank you, our Christ.... Thank God.... Thank you. My God! (Chávez, 2012)<sup>49</sup>

Chávez made several appropriations of statements that Jesus made in the Bible, to support his construction as a leader:

(14) in this battle to continue making reality precisely the project of Jesus my commander, of Jesus of Nazareth, "blessed are the poor because theirs will be my kingdom", blessed are the boys, blessed are the girls, blessed are the peoples because theirs will be this kingdom, the kingdom of the homeland, the kingdom of socialist democracy.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>50</sup>

Besides using spiritual and religious ideas, Chávez also utilized the cultural and historical elements of his country to construct the image of the leader. This brings us to the second subcategory, which is named *ascultural and historical concepts*. This subcategory is about the construction of an image that is formed not only through sharing the same faith, but through sharing cultural codes, words, and the historical context that define the Venezuelan people. Chávez showed himself to be one of them, a common citizen, from the lower class of Venezuelan society:

(15) Of course, I want to visit as many cities and towns and neighborhoods because it is very pleasant for me, I am a street man, I am a man born on the street, born and raised on the street, in the neighborhood between the poor, see? among the people who dream and who fight and I love this contact, it feeds me a lot, it gives me a lot of life, you know? (Chávez, 2012)<sup>51</sup>

Additionally, Chávez self-granted representativeness for his patriotism:

(16) As a player in the political game, I come here to comply with the Law, and I promise, and I promise my followers who are, you

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<sup>48</sup> \_\_ [HC03] APRIL 30, 2012 - SPEECH - NEW LABOR LAW - CARACAS. \_\_ p. 32

<sup>49</sup> \_\_ [HC09] OCTOBER 7, 2012 - VICTORY SPEECH. \_\_ pp. 232-242

<sup>50</sup> \_\_ [HC01] MARCH 16, 2012 - SPEECH - CARACAS INT. AIRPOT. \_\_p. 2

<sup>51</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 93

know, millions, to support all the actions of the electoral referee, and I promise to recognize before Venezuela and the world the result of the presidential elections of October 7... I became a patriot, or life made me a patriot as a child, as an adolescent, as a little soldier, when we began to sing and feel the homeland, as someone said, even in the guts, (Chávez, 2012)<sup>52</sup>

Chávez also presented himself as the icon of the Venezuelan -and South American- revolution:

(17) So, we did, and we continue to do a political revolution and then we have started the social revolution through the socialist missions, to defeat poverty, misery, backwardness, to ensure everyone food, health, education, employment decent, housing, social security. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>53</sup>

(18) Someone believes that UNASUR would exist if the Bolivarian Revolution had not been born here. In truth, it is very difficult that South America could have achieved it. I want to greet from here on this day, to all my colleagues, presidents and presidents of South America, this great South American homeland. To Cristina Fernandez! (Chávez, 2012)<sup>54</sup>

(19) Only through these paths of the socialist and democratic revolution will we be able to continue giving the people what belongs to the people, we will be able to continue raising living standards in addition to freedom, equality... that is the fundamental objective of the Bolivarian revolution, and it is what I have embodied in the government proposal for the next period 2013-2019 (Chávez, 2012)<sup>55</sup>

In Chávez's speeches, his trajectory as being the only and real solution to the problems of the country and Venezuelans is reoccurring:

(20) I will have to be attending to multiple battle fronts, Head of Government as I am I must be attending to government affairs every day, helping to solve problems every day, just yesterday I was signing last night, approving an additional loan that now goes to the Assembly to continue strengthening the great missions, in *Amor Mayor, Hijos de Venezuela, Agro-Venezuela*, injecting resources to the neediest, to the poor.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> \_\_ [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. \_\_ p. 41

<sup>53</sup> \_\_ [HC07] SEPTEMBER 15, 2012 - SPEECH - SAN FERNANDO, APURE. \_\_ p. 203

<sup>54</sup> \_\_ [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. \_\_ p. 63

<sup>55</sup> \_\_ [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. \_\_ p. 104

<sup>56</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, pp. 102-103

Chávez made constant use of colloquialism as part of the Venezuelan ideology:

(21) No *compadre* [fellow], that is another *cuentico*[little story] that the opposition sides carry, that if I am dying, that I am not going to put up with the campaign, that if Elías is already the successor but the military does not accept it, Rangel Silva has his command with Diosdado, Adán Chávez in Barinas, with Rafael Ramírez in the east, in the west Arias Cárdenas, well, they have a whole *telenovela* [soap opera], we are going to show them what revolutionary unity is. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>57</sup>

(22) Modest ideas of this soldier, of this one, as you call me then, of this Chávez, of this stubborn Chávez, stubborn Chávez.... I was looking through a window, through a window in Miraflores, I look around.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>58</sup>

Chávez made approaches that led him by default to appear closer, like a relative or a friend:

(23) Rosa, oh! (Singing) Rosa, *tan maravillosa como flor hermosa* [marvelous as a beautiful flower]. Aha, hello! *Pelón* [Bald], how are you, bro? And, where did you get that haircut? (Chávez, 2012)<sup>59</sup>

He made use of popular or literature citations:

(24) ...harder than pinching a donkey to death... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>60</sup>

(25) Don Quixote said: if the dogs bark it's because we're riding, let's keep riding Rangel Silva... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>61</sup>

(26) I am going to say it once again with Bolívar, the following phrase is from Bolívar the father, to see if I remember it almost verbatim, Bolívar says in 1820, if I remember correctly, he said, wrote, and said: "The impulse of this revolution It is already given, nothing and no one will be able to stop it, the most that can be done is to give it a good direction (the most that can be done is to give a good direction to the revolution) retrograde would be chaos for everyone..." And he ends by

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<sup>57</sup> \_\_ [HC02] MARCH 17, 2012 - SPEECH - ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANDIDACY - VARGAS. \_\_ p. 24

<sup>58</sup> \_\_ [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. \_\_ p. 86

<sup>59</sup> \_\_ [HC06] AUGUST 17, 2012 - SPEECH - SAN AGUSTIN, DC. \_\_ p. 143

<sup>60</sup> \_\_ [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. \_\_ p. 103

<sup>61</sup> \_\_ [HC02] MARCH 17, 2012 - SPEECH - ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANDIDACY - VARGAS. \_\_ p. 12

saying: “We must triumph by the path of the revolution, by no other would we triumph...” (Chávez, 2012)<sup>62</sup>

And lastly, Chávez built his image through the expression of constant commitment as a person of trust:

(27) Thank you, my God, for allowing me to stand here today, in front of you, fulfilling the commitment to register the candidacy to continue at the forefront of the battle towards the new victory, to the victory of October 7 that we will work on step by step, minute by minute. minute, day after day between now and October 7th to then open the new gates, let’s put it that way. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>63</sup>

#### 4.2.2. Donald Trump

In the case of Donald Trump, it must be noted that we are talking about a businessman. He could have learned and developed over the years the [self-]promotion tools he required to promote not only his electoral campaign, but to build his own play character. Unlike his Venezuelan counterpart, Trump did not rely entirely on religious ideologies. Of course, he considered religion as important, because the USA is a country with a protestant Christian majority,<sup>64</sup> and second, his Republican party has a more right-wing religious constituency. Notwithstanding the emphasis on religion in Trump’s speeches, he emphasized his professional/social background to build his leader image than his appeal to religion and spirituality. Trump used what was already happening in his life, such as business success, wealth, power, supremacy, autonomy, projection, capacity, among others to convince the people that he was a capable leader. Those were also concepts that corroborate quite well with the American values.<sup>65</sup> Knowing well those values and beliefs proper of his culture, Trump built an image of a heroic leader. A type of “superman,”<sup>66</sup> an outsider of the USA corrupt politicians’ group. Trump proposed himself as someone who came to fight against the enemy of the American people -the establishment- to restore security, stability, and peace back to all the inhabitants of the USA.

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<sup>62</sup>Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez’s speeches, p. 86

<sup>63</sup> \_\_ [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. \_\_ pp. 53-54

<sup>64</sup> Seven in ten Americans (70%) identify as Christian, including more than four in ten who identify as white Christian and more than one-quarter who identify as Christian of color. Source: <https://www.pri.org/research/2020-census-of-american-religion/>

<sup>65</sup> ... The Future, Change... Progress... Achievement, Action, Work, and Materialism.... Source: <https://www.up.edu/iss/advising-services/american-values.html>

<sup>66</sup> “Superheroes are strong, successful, able to make the best of any circumstance, they get the girl, they kick butt and they always come out on top....” Source: <https://universe.byu.edu/2013/03/12/why-america-loves-superheroes/>

A further considerable difference with Chávez was that Trump did use a formal and political approach in his narrative. All his speeches were scripted. Trump's public appearances featured prewritten speeches; it was notable that he was reading these scripts all the time. Trump's informality and spontaneity were limited to the beginning part or closure part of his speeches. When these informal and spontaneous signs appeared in the middle of Trump's speeches, it did not take long for him to quickly turn back to the original text. In addition, he always used numbers, data and exact-clear information, something that in this case seems necessary to build his credibility and generate reliability:

(28) In NATO, for instance, only four of twenty-eight other member countries besides America, are spending the minimum required two percent of GDP on defense. We have spent trillions of dollars over time on planes, missiles, ships, equipment, building up our military to provide a strong defense for Europe and Asia. (Trump, 2016)<sup>67</sup>

One more remarkable trait from the analysis was that, to support his own image, Trump was always minimizing his opponent. This was done through direct accusations with adjectives such as incapacity, ineptitude, perversion, fallacy, among others. It is as if he needed to belittle the rival in order for him to shine more, and create the perfect personal leader image, presented to "the people." In this category Trump induces a connection with "the people" by placing himself as the only leader capable of saving the American people from calamity. Trump's personal merits are grouped in this category. According to Trump, these merits make him worthy of becoming a representative of "the people." As Figure 4.2 shows, there are two subcategories for Trump's construction of the leader image. The first of these categories is his appeal to *religious concepts*. As it is mentioned before there are not very frequent, yet they are still important to consider when one recalls the religious constituency among the Republican Party supporters.

(29) We left Christians subject to intense persecution and even genocide.... We have done nothing to help the Christians, nothing, and we should always be ashamed for that, for that lack of action.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>68</sup>

(30) In this journey, I'm so lucky to have at my side my wife, Melania, and my wonderful children.... God bless you... (Trump, 2016)<sup>69</sup>

(31) We're living in a very divided nation. We're going to be brought together. Just imagine what our country could accomplish if we

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<sup>67</sup> [DT01] APRIL 27, 2016 - SPEECH - FOREIGN POLICY - WASHINGTON DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, p. 3

<sup>68</sup> [DT01] APRIL 27, 2016 - SPEECH - FOREIGN POLICY - WASHINGTON DC. \_\_\_ p. 5

<sup>69</sup> [DT03] JULY 21, 2016 - SPEECH - REP. NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE - OH. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, pp. 48, 50

started working together as one people, under one God... (Trump, 2016)<sup>70</sup>

(32) I see people of different backgrounds working together for a common good and we need to bring that spirit to every part of our country, and become one American nation, united by shared values and principles as American citizens. We have to do it... (Trump, 2016)<sup>71</sup>

The second subcategory that operationalizes Trump's construction of his leader image is about specific concepts Trump refers to in order to associate himself with the American ethos. This subcategory is named *ascultural and historical concepts*, which is based on American concept of success:

(33) I have a message to every last person threatening the peace on our streets and the safety of our police.... I will restore law and order to our country.... In this race for the White House, I am the law-and-order candidate! .... I will do everything to protect our.... Citizens.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>72</sup>

Trump present himself as the only capable one, the only viable option for the people:

(34) I am the only person running for the presidency who understands this, and this is a serious problem. I'm the only one, believe me, I know them all, I'm the only one who knows how to fix it. (Trump, 2016)<sup>73</sup>

Highlighting his autonomy to act without depending on anyone but himself. Which also makes him "the outsider", someone without ties to corrupt politics:

(35) It's going to happen, folks. Because I am proudly not a politician, because I am not beholdng to any special interest, I've spent a lot of money on my campaign, I'll tell you. I write those checks. Nobody owns Trump. I will get this done for you and for your family. We'll do it right.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>74</sup>

Trump presented himself as someone able to create jobs:

(36) creating countless more jobs for our country in the process. Overall, my entire economic plan, tax reform, regulatory

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<sup>70</sup> [DT08] NOVEMBER 7, 2016 - SPEECH - GRAND RAPIDS. \_\_ p. 164

<sup>71</sup> [DT06] SEPTEMBER 22, 2016 - SPEECH - PLAN FOR AMERICAN ENERGY - PITTSBURG. \_\_ p. 89

<sup>72</sup> [DT03] JULY 21, 2016 - SPEECH - REP. NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE – OH. \_\_ pp. 37, 38

<sup>73</sup> [DT01] APRIL 27, 2016 - SPEECH - FOREIGN POLICY - WASHINGTON DC. \_\_ p. 3

<sup>74</sup> [DT05] AUGUST 31, 2016 - SPEECH - IMMIGRATION - PHOENIX. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, p. 83

reform, energy reform, and trade reform, will create at least 25 million new jobs over the next 10 years.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>75</sup>

Trump showed himself as someone visionary, capable, and credible since he constantly uses information backed by known research sources to offer formal data. Trump expresses this data with the appropriate professional terms:

(37) I have a different vision for our workers. It begins with a new fair-trade policy that protects our jobs and stands up to countries that cheat, of which there are many. It's been a signature message of my campaign from day one, and it will be a signature feature of my presidency from the moment I take the oath of office. I have made billions of dollars in business making deals. Now I'm going to make our country rich again.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>76</sup>

(38) If you look at your voter rolls, you will see millions of people that are registered to vote, millions, this isn't coming from me, this is coming from Pew Report and other places.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>77</sup>

Trump, construct this leader image by being also controversial:

(39) So, I just want to ask you one question, if you don't mind, at one in the morning: Who is going to pay for the wall? [Audience says: Mexico!] A hundred percent. They don't know it yet, but they're going to pay. Now, we are going to have a great relationship with Mexico, but right now it's a one-way street. We can't have that. We can't have that. They're going to build the wall.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>78</sup>

(40) Now, I want to build the wall. We need the wall. And the Border Patrol, ICE, they all want the wall. We stop the drugs. We shore up the border. One of my first acts will be to get all of the drug lords, all of the bad ones, we have some bad, bad people in this country that have to go out.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>79</sup>

Trump based his ability to rule in his prosperity<sup>80</sup> and wealth, which are also key concepts of the American culture:

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<sup>75</sup> [DT06] SEPTEMBER 22, 2016 - SPEECH - PLAN FOR AMERICAN ENERGY - PITTSBURG. \_\_ p. 93

<sup>76</sup> [DT03] JULY 21, 2016 - SPEECH - REP. NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE – OH. \_\_ p. 42

<sup>77</sup> [DT07] OCTOBER 19, 2016 - DEBATE #3. \_\_ p. 133

<sup>78</sup> [DT08] NOVEMBER 7, 2016 - SPEECH - GRAND RAPIDS. \_\_ pp. 161-162

<sup>79</sup> [DT07] OCTOBER 19, 2016 - DEBATE #3. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, p. 106

<sup>80</sup> If there is one outcome of liberty that makes possible all the rights Americans hold dear, it is prosperity. Source: <https://www.heritage.org/international-economies/report/understanding-american-prosperity>

(41) This is the way it is, is the bottom line. I started off in Brooklyn, New York not so long ago with a small loan and built a business that today is worth well over \$10 billion. That's the kind of thinking we need in our leadership of our country. I've always had a talent for building businesses.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>81</sup>

### 4.3. Non-Verbal Communication

#### 4.3.1. Hugo Chávez

The way Chávez used nonverbal communication seems intriguing. This is due to the grade of genuineness with which he executed it. Indeed, it would not be too much of an exaggeration if one claims that if Chávez achieved some connection with the people via his speeches, he completed this connection and carried it to another level with his non-verbal communication and other physical reactions. Chávez danced, sang, was moved, and laughed in the middle of his speeches. These were the most euphoric flashes with his followers, and these were the moments that marked supporter's lives. The clearest example from the selection of samples chosen for this study was undoubtedly the closing campaign speech. With a response of gigantic ovations "*bajo la lluvia*"<sup>82</sup>[under the rain] speech was undoubtedly one of the most prominent of Chávez' speeches. The former was coded in the journal of this thesis as HC08, here Chávez gave a complete show of dance, happiness, and frenzy.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to focus just on one example, because in all of his speeches, there were always memorable moments to highlight. Like the speech<sup>83</sup> in *San Fernando de Apure*<sup>84</sup> in September 2012, where at the end of his intervention Chávez cried, while he was singing folk music in front of the crowd. In other occasions Chávez was seen walking with people in large concentrations, carrying children, hugging, or calling people from the public to the stage. Crying, laughing, making heart figures with his hands, shaking his own hands as "a sign of gratitude or brotherhood" were examples of strong non-verbal communication style Chávez used, and which undoubtedly strengthened the bond he aimed to forge with "the people." He revealed expressions of joy, sympathy towards "the people," or gestures of hatred and contempt for enemies. For instance:

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<sup>81</sup> [DT02] JUNE 22, 2016 - SPEECH - THE STAKES OF THE ELECTION - NY. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, p. 15

<sup>82</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S18AcyuwXVY&t=451s>

<sup>83</sup> [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXUKr6p\\_AqQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXUKr6p_AqQ)

<sup>84</sup> capital of Apure estado (state), west-central Venezuela. Source: <https://www.britannica.com/place/San-Fernando-de-Apure>

(42) Look, I was dancing here to nothing more and nothing less than Cristina Maica! I just danced. *¡Quétepasapues!* [a way of saying, I also can dance like you] .... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>85</sup>

(43) I had the data here, more details about this... This is not the material I had. They hid it from me, which happens very often. That I scratch my papers and then they hide them from me. (Laughs) Or they bring me others that are not.... That girl that is there, where is she going? She came running. Did she get away from you? Yes? God bless you. Look, hello! *Chiquitica* [little girl] (Laughing) .... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>86</sup>

#### 4.3.2. Donald Trump

With reference to the case of Trump, this type of communication was not used as much, or rather, “it did not have such a perceptible impact” when we compare him with Chávez. Unlike his peer, Trump’s body expressions were concrete, and may have been intended to be a strategic approach when used. This has a lot to do with his personality, profession and even culture<sup>87</sup>. However, there are examples indeed, like the time he hugged and kissed some participants who joined him onstage at his campaign speech in Phoenix, Arizona<sup>88</sup> on August 2016.

#### 4.4. Construction of “The People”

If we compare the two cases, the image of the people Chávez and Trump created, were completely different. On the one hand, American history, Trump’s upbringing, and his social status all resulted in championing the American individualism. “U.S. Americans do not like to think of themselves as being dependent upon others or as others being dependent upon them. This can affect the boundaries placed on personal relationships.”<sup>89</sup> This means that Trump’s way of approaching and gaining support was different from Chávez in Venezuela, which “lies amongst the most

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<sup>85</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez’s speeches, p. 54

<sup>86</sup> \_\_ [HC06] AUGUST 17, 2012 - SPEECH - SAN AGUSTIN, DC. \_\_ pp. 156, 188

<sup>87</sup> ...emotional expressions are strongly tied to culture. Source: <https://www.commisceo-global.com/blog/cultural-differences-in-facial-expressions>

<sup>88</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xU8wMJCCFUI>

<sup>89</sup> Source: <https://pips.partners.org/life-in-the-united-states/american-culture/individualism.aspx#sthash.JyUTIare.dpuf>

collectivistic cultures in the world.”<sup>90</sup> Through its history and education Venezuela built a society with collective values, which are translated into devotedness.<sup>91</sup>

#### 4.4.1. Hugo Chávez

Chávez’s construction of “the people” concept by was inspired was inspired by the poorest social class. This structure was founded on a consistent Chávez’s attitude of holding onto to the distinctive features of this marginalized community. For him, that group needed to be recognized as the best, the purest, the heroic, and of course the wounded group in the records of the South American country. Chávez also separated the members of his people from the perceived enemy’s core values such as being swindle, claiming supremacy, imposing discrimination, seek for privileges, and praise individualism. He created an imaginary people, based on the victimization of the poorest classes, as being the true sons and daughters of Simon Bolivar, the icon of the revolution and liberator of Venezuela from Spanish occupation. Chávez was very clear in his speeches to say who was and who was not part of this group. He named this group after him, using his last name *Chávez*, and his corrupt adversary as “*el imperio*” [The Empire], referring to the USA.

The Chávez group was “closed” almost hermetically since there was no room for the rich to enter, and sometimes it seemed that there was no room in the Chávez group for the middle class either. We must consider that Chávez included himself in this group many times since he claimed to come from a poor family that lived in the countryside. There are two subcategories designated for Chávez’s construction of the concept of the people. The first category is about those particular characteristics that represent the “Venezuelanness” of the people, hence it is named as the *particular unifying characteristics of “the people”*. This is done highlighting the symbols that are part of the Venezuelan identity:

(44) The sport! Tomorrow the Olympics are inaugurated, we will be aware of our boys and girls who will undoubtedly raise the Venezuelan tricolor flag, the golden youth, the golden generation.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>92</sup>

(45) Here we are, the children of *Guaicaipuro*<sup>93</sup>. Who sits here, *Guaicaipuro*? We are all *Guaicaipuro* and their war cry against the

<sup>90</sup> At a score of 12 Venezuela is amongst the lowest Individualist scores.... Source: <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country/venezuela/>

<sup>91</sup> <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country/venezuela/>

<sup>92</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - PEECH - EL VALLE, DC. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez’s speeches, p. 120

<sup>93</sup> A leader considered a symbolic hero of the country’s indigenous struggles against Spanish colonialism Source: <https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Venezuela-Celebrates-Indigenous-Resistance-Leader-Guaicaipuro-20151208-0028.html>

Spanish empire Ana Karina Rote... that's where we come from, from the aboriginal resistance, from the Indian resistance, from the black resistance... We are the patriots of July 5, April 19, we are the soldiers of José Félix Ribas in *La Victoria*... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>94</sup>

These characteristics highlighted the goodness and dignity the true Venezuelan people:

(46) Of the dignity of Venezuela! Of the dignity of the homeland of our elders, the homeland of our sons, our daughters, our granddaughters, our grandsons! That is us, national dignity. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>95</sup>

(47) *Apure* is an essential part of the homeland -I feel so, I feel so- and its people, this heroic, brave, noble and good people, a good race, Rómulo Gallegos would say, a good race, a good land, a good land with a very great potential. Hurry for the homeland is root, root, essence, impulse and a great engine, a greeting to all the people of *Apureño* from these sheets of *San Fernando*.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>96</sup>

Besides, it was evident that for Chávez, the people as a group was made up mainly of the needy, “the working class” and the lowest of Venezuelan society. As it is also shown in the section that discussed Chávez leader image, he deliberately associated himself with this group of people:

(48) Children of Venezuela, pregnant women in poverty, families in poverty.... Blessed are the poor because theirs will be the Kingdom of Heaven.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>97</sup>

(49) Approving an additional credit that now goes to the Assembly to continue strengthening the great missions, in *Amor Mayor, Hijos de Venezuela, Agro-Venezuela*, injecting resources to the most needy, to the poor. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>98</sup>

Chávez also qualified this group as the true defenders of the homeland. To refer not only to the poor, but a narrative tactic to give value and include into “the people”

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<sup>94</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC08] OCTOBER 4, 2012 - SPEECH - CAMPAING CLOUSURE - CARACAS, DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 221

<sup>95</sup> \_\_ [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. \_\_ p. 58

<sup>96</sup> \_\_ [HC07] SEPTEMBER 15, 2012 - SPEECH - SAN FERNANDO, APURE. \_\_ p. 191

<sup>97</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC02] MARCH 17, 2012 - SPEECH - ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANDIDACY - VARGAS. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 21

<sup>98</sup> \_\_ [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. \_\_ p. 103

group: the military forces of the country. It was evident that he did everything to keep militaries on his side, something which may be due to his past military career:<sup>99</sup>

(50) Well, let's do the work, let's all do the work together, popular power, social power, the military wielding its sword in defense of social guarantees, always and forever, together with the people, the military of the homeland of Bolívar. How proud I feel, to be one more soldier of the heroic Bolivarian Armed Forces... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>100</sup>

(51) How could we guarantee those open gates of independence, socialism and a powerful country, if we did not have truly powerful Armed Forces, a popular and military power to defend the country from any internal or external aggression?... strengthening ourselves morally, the Armed Forces and also, the militias with the Army, the Navy, the Aviation, the National Guard, the Bolivarian Militias and all the people; Defense is a problem for the entire Bolivarian people. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>101</sup>

Another interesting characteristic of Chávez's construction of "the people" in the Venezuelan context, was that he constantly referred to this group as the sons and daughters of Simon Bolivar, who is a figure that was not only important for this country, but for the rest of South America as well. By doing so, he evoked the concept of a long-standing noble family for the construction of the leader-people bond. "Throughout his 14-year rule, Chavez often evoked Bolivar's image, claiming his socialist state was just the next phase in Bolivar's campaign to liberate the continent from outside domination."<sup>102</sup>

(52) We are the children of Simón Bolívar! The daughters of Simón Bolívar! We are the patriots of July 5... We are the sons of Bolívar, the daughters of Bolívar.... the general of the sovereign people. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>103</sup>

(53) We are the patriotic people, the sons of Bolívar, the daughters of Bolívar. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Chávez started his military career as a second lieutenant in the army.... On February 4, 1992, Chávez and a group of military officers led an attempt to overthrow the government of Pres. Carlos Andrés Pérez. Source: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hugo-Chavez>

<sup>100</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC02] MARCH 17, 2012 - SPEECH - ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANDIDACY - VARGAS. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 21

<sup>101</sup> \_\_ [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. \_\_ p. 82

<sup>102</sup> Source: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hugo-chavez-independence-hero-simon-bolivar-be-united-death-flna1c8764684>

<sup>103</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC08] OCTOBER 4, 2012 - SPEECH - CAMPAIGN CLOSURE - CARACAS, DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, pp. 221, 240

<sup>104</sup> \_\_ [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. \_\_ p. 46

According to Chávez narrative, having a hero as a “father”, these sons and daughters are also characterized by their heroism and revolutionary character:

(54) We will have to remember, well, February 4, we will have to remember April 11, April 12, how a hurricane came down here towards Fuerte Tiuna to unite with the revolutionary soldiers to rescue democracy and give continuity to the Revolution, so I come with a lot of patriotic spirit, to share these hours with this heroic and good people.... these ghettos, of so many struggles, of so much heroism, of so many people, of so much revolutionary progress and so many hopes.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>105</sup>

Although the following code could be clustered in another subcategory of *self-construction as “the leader”* category. It may be considered better to fit as part of the *particular unifying characteristics of “the people”* subcategory, of *construction of “the people”* main category (see figure 4.1). For the reason that Chávez further limited the group of “the people” by using his image, or rather; his last name, to turn it into a brand that would separate those who really belonged to “the people” from those who did not:

(55) Chávez is the heart of the people, and the people are the heart of Chávez because Chávez is no longer me, Chávez is the people of Venezuela, I am no longer Chávez.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>106</sup>

Chávez also made use of the common characteristic of victimization to delimit the members of the group:

(56) I will willingly consume myself in the service of the people and above all the suffering people, the most needy people, the most suffered people, the people who have been waiting for dignity, life, social justice for so long. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>107</sup>

Moving on, the second subcategory: *unlinking “the people” from enemies’ core values*. In this section seeks to differentiate the common people from the elite. For this, it marks the limits of the core values of Chávez’s enemies, hence the people’s enemies. Basically, this category specifies those characteristics which would disqualify individuals to be member of the true Venezuelan people. A permanent feature of the corrupt elite is lying, according to Chávez, the enemy was always characterized by deceiving the people. For this reason, he tries to distance this trait from the integrity of the people to which he belonged:

(57) They try to deceive. Well, they always did it like that really.... The *majunchismo*<sup>108</sup>, on the other hand, is the other side of the

<sup>105</sup> \_\_ [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. \_\_ pp. 90, 98

<sup>106</sup> \_\_ [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. \_\_ p. 113

<sup>107</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez’s speeches, p. 49

<sup>108</sup> In the popular sphere, it refers to a group or person with low credibility and reliability. For others, “refers to something of very poor quality or an undesirable person”. Source: <https://www.venezuelablog.org/voting-in-catia/>

coin, they are sepoys, they are wimps, my *General Sandino* would say. They are the homeland sellouts! They are the colonialism that will never return to this Bolivarian land! (Chávez, 2012)<sup>109</sup>

On this point, it may be useful to remember Chávez's iconic phrase "being rich is bad, it is inhumane"<sup>110</sup> made in 2005 on his Sunday television show "*Alópresidente*" [hello president].<sup>111</sup> His approach was not changed by 2012 and indeed the difference between the poor and the rich was what distinguished the good from the bad:

(58) You see the Caracas of the rich, with all due respect to those who live there, the Caracas of the rich has everything and the Caracas of the poor have been abandoned to their fate, the miserable *ranchos*[referring to a house in disrepair], hunger, and poverty.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>112</sup>

This led Chávez to make class distinction constantly:

(59) We are going to talk about the middle class, the middle sectors, ahhh how the upper bourgeoisie scams the middle class, some do not realize it, some are so poisoned that they do not realize it and this is one of the objectives of the big bourgeoisie, to poison to confuse people. I remember that lady who, well, turned into a wild beast broke that rice, the packet of rice and threw it in the face of Eduardo Samán when he was my Minister of Commerce... her hatred against us is so great that she did not he cares about launching himself, maybe, from a 40th floor, see, the evil of the upper bourgeoisie, he launched me happy because the bourgeoisie sends me uuuu! and he launched himself, see, when all we are doing is to protect the consumer, to the family, and we do not care if it is from low sectors, medium sectors. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>113</sup>

Chávez uncovered the privileges and other elite amenities, which, according to him were contrary to the people's values:

(60) save whoever can, that is the neoliberal thesis, capitalism, since they eat enough, they condemn the people to hunger.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>109</sup>Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 58

<sup>110</sup> Source: <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-venezuela-chavez-quotes-idUKBRE92418N20130305>

<sup>111</sup> Read more at: <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2007/sep/25/venezuela.television>

<sup>112</sup>Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 116

<sup>113</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC06] AUGUST 17, 2012 - SPEECH - SAN AGUSTIN, DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 140

<sup>114</sup> \_\_ [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. \_\_ p. 67

(61) Let's not allow ourselves to be bureaucratized, let's not allow ourselves to be absorbed by the bureaucracy, the office, the meetings, the analysis, the air conditioning, the driver and the good salary. No, all that is worthless... Do you think that a bourgeois government that was installed in Venezuela would really meet the food needs of our people? for example.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>115</sup>

Finally, Chávez was able to separate “the people” from the individualistic ideas that define the opposing bourgeoisie, who represented the rich:

(62) The economy will continue to grow and we, too, will generate more collective wealth to distribute it on equal terms, or to generate equality, this means that wealth must be distributed in greater proportion to those who need it most. That is a fundamental principle to achieve equality, to each according to their needs. What does the bourgeoisie say? (Chávez, 2012)<sup>116</sup>

#### 4.4.2. Donald Trump

Trump's construction of “the people” was based on notions of nationalism and the American ethos of justice, order, and progress. Unlike Chávez, Trump's construction did not evoke any hostility towards the upper class, to which he belonged. Trump frequently referred to the working or the middle classes, made up mainly of white Americans. While it is true that he never said it explicitly, Trump's narrative is cluttered with exclusionary marks towards non-white Americans, such as “calling Mexican immigrants criminals and rapists, to proposing a ban on all Muslims entering the US, to suggesting a judge should recuse himself from a case solely because of the judge's Mexican heritage.”<sup>117</sup> These remarks implicitly demonstrated who were not, for Trump, part of the pure people. Trump, similar to Chávez differentiated “the people” from the people's enemy. While doing so, he did not refrain from directly and pejoratively condemning the corrupt other, the enemies of the people.

Two subcategories are used to delve into the ways Trump constructed “the people” in the American context. The first one of these subcategories is the *particular unifying characteristics of “the people”*. Trump's people were also a group of victimized citizens, the “real” Americans, who lost their own identity, their territory, their jobs, their rights under previous governments, and all these losses compromised their security, and values. Trump frequently mentioned those of losses the people

<sup>115</sup> \_\_ [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. \_\_ p. 108

<sup>116</sup> \_\_ [HC02] MARCH 17, 2012 - SPEECH - ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANDIDACY - VARGAS. \_\_ p. 23

<sup>117</sup> Source: <https://www.vox.com/2016/7/25/12270880/donald-trump-racist-racism-history>

experienced and further, Trump claimed that he also underwent a similar process of loss. In Trump's speeches, the concept of the "true" American is dispersed in different parts; hence is rather challenging to cite a single example. Yet, in majority of his speeches Trump refers to "true" Americans as those having rightful claim to American citizenship. In Trump's speeches foreigners or aliens who live there but do not have the citizenship, are excluded from belonging to "the people." The people, as a group is only made up of American nationals:

(63) We will be fair, just, and compassionate to all, but our greatest compassion must be for our American citizens.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>118</sup>

For Trump, this group is also made up of those who are constantly being threatened:

(64) Americans losing their jobs to foreign workers... (Trump, 2016)<sup>119</sup>

Those whose security and socio-economic stability has been compromised:

(65) Tonight, I want every American whose demands for immigration security have been denied and every politician who has denied them to listen very, very closely to the words I am about to say. On January 20th of 2017 the day I take the oath of office.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>120</sup>

(66) Making America Wealthy Again especially for the poorest Americans.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>121</sup>

The law-and-order aspect of being a part of "the people" was also mentioned frequently by Trump:

(67) We're going to rebuild our military and take care of our veterans who have not been taken care of properly. We are going to take care of our vets.... We will support the great men and women of law enforcement.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>122</sup>

Trump includes patriots, veterans in his construction of "the people:"

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<sup>118</sup> [DT05] AUGUST 31, 2016 - SPEECH - IMMIGRATION - PHOENIX. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, p. 71

<sup>119</sup> \_\_ p. 85

<sup>120</sup> [DT03] JULY 21, 2016 - SPEECH - REP. NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE – OH. \_\_ p. 41

<sup>121</sup> [DT06] SEPTEMBER 22, 2016 - SPEECH - PLAN FOR AMERICAN ENERGY - PITTSBURG. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, p. 92

<sup>122</sup> [DT08] NOVEMBER 7, 2016 - SPEECH - GRAND RAPIDS. \_\_ p. 163

(68) Patriotic citizens from all backgrounds... (Trump, 2016)<sup>123</sup>

(69) Our veterans have not been treated fairly or justly. These are our great people, and we must treat them fairly.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>124</sup>

And of course, “the victims” who are killed because of the current government are also designated by Trump as part of the people:

(70) All of the other Americans who have been so brutally murdered and who have suffered so, so horribly? These wounded American families have been alone, but they are not alone any longer.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>125</sup>

The second subcategory in this section is named *unlinking “the people” from enemies’ core values*. It explains the characteristics that define the people’s enemies. For Trump, they are the threat and main cause of all evils, hence they would never become a part of the people:

(71) We have groups that no matter what you do, they will be the enemy. We have to be smart enough to recognize who those groups are, who those people are, and not help them. And we must only be generous to those that prove they are indeed our friends.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>126</sup>

The enemy group included the establishment politicians and their figures and supporters. Democrats and Trump’s rival in 2016 American Presidential Elections, Hillary Clinton, were not exceptions:

(72) The entire corrupt Washington establishment.... The politicians and.... all Democrats.... Hillary Clinton and our failed establishment have dragged us into foreign wars.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>127</sup>

(73) No longer can we rely on those same people in the media and politics who will say anything to keep a rigged system in place.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>128</sup>

Criminals and terrorists were also excluded from Trump’s group of “the people:”

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<sup>123</sup> [DT05] AUGUST 31, 2016 - SPEECH - IMMIGRATION - PHOENIX. \_\_ p. 68

<sup>124</sup> [DT01] APRIL 27, 2016 - SPEECH - FOREIGN POLICY - WASHINGTON DC. \_\_ p. 8

<sup>125</sup> [DT03] JULY 21, 2016 - SPEECH - REP. NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE - OH. \_\_ p. 40

<sup>126</sup> [DT01] APRIL 27, 2016 - SPEECH - FOREIGN POLICY - WASHINGTON DC. \_\_ p. 9

<sup>127</sup> [DT08] NOVEMBER 7, 2016 - SPEECH - GRAND RAPIDS. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump’s speeches, pp. 154, 160, 162

<sup>128</sup> [DT03] JULY 21, 2016 - SPEECH - REP. NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE - OH. \_\_ p. 49

(74) Refugees from the most dangerous countries on earth...  
(Trump, 2016)<sup>129</sup>

(75) Criminal immigrants and terrorists are swiftly...  
identified.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>130</sup>

## 4.5. Crisis Identification

### 4.5.1. Hugo Chávez

In the case of Chávez, the crisis he identified was purely internal, caused by external agents. For Chávez the problems lay in the socio-economic inequality of Venezuelans, resulting in years of injustice committed by the corrupt elite in distributing wealth to all classes of society. According to Chávez the poor did not have access to quality education, health, and decent housing, they did not even have enough to eat. This was the crisis for Chávez. He further claimed that the USA, its followers, and tenets such as savage capitalism and neoliberalism were the agents of Venezuelan crisis still in 2012. These accusations lacked decency and political attitude since he constantly used offensive terms to refer to the members and leaders of the enemy agents. Among those terms we found the popular “*yanqui*,” “*pitiyanqui*,” and “*majunche*.” [all three are popular words to refer individuals from the USA, or supporters of the imperialism]<sup>131</sup>

Chávez completed this category by offering the solution of socialism and plans for revolution against the elite. His plan consisted of filling the country with social missions that attended to the basic needs. In this way he aimed at alleviating the deprivation which was long-lasting. According to Chávez’s judgements, this category was built on the basis of the “enemy” of the Venezuelan people. He pointed out repeatedly those who were undoubtedly responsible for the former existing situation in Venezuela. For him, the unprecedented socio-economic crisis had to be solved. The first category in this section is *problems exposure*, and it refers to the leader’s explanation of the existing problems. For socio-economic inequality, Chávez said for instance:

(76) What the government of the big rich does is rob the people of their wealth, their land, their oil, their natural wealth, so that they

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<sup>129</sup> [DT02] JUNE 22, 2016 - SPEECH - THE STAKES OF THE ELECTION - NY. \_\_ p. 21

<sup>130</sup> [DT05] AUGUST 31, 2016 - SPEECH - IMMIGRATION - PHOENIX. \_\_ p. 75

<sup>131</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/06/world/americas/06venez.html>

become richer and that is how they produce misery, the greatest poverty.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>132</sup>

Chávez also remarked the injustices and the awful distribution of the wealth, which by right belongs to “the people:”

(77) The *adeco-copeyano* candidate and the bourgeoisie must have in his head the Venezuela of back in the 90s, when they governed, because there it is true that there were millions of people suffering from hunger in Venezuela, millions, and that was one of the causes precisely of the *Caracazo*, hunger, hunger, infant malnutrition, infant mortality, unemployment, misery, while they lined their pockets, while they accumulated great wealth by exploiting and stealing the wealth of the people .... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>133</sup>

Chávez exposed in his speeches a corruption crisis prior to his government:

(78) He precisely represents the exploiting, looting and starving bourgeoisie. He says: zero hunger. It must be remembered that at this moment, we have to attend to the poorer, poorer population, the product of historical robbing, of that bourgeoisie to which the candidate belongs... that I don't know how many millions of people without eating, it was true when they ruled the country. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>134</sup>

Chávez used the threats that came from the enemy as a polarizing tool in his narrative:

(79) They divided Venezuela into little pieces, they dismembered it... their project is to end independence and reinstall colonialism in Venezuela and turn Venezuela once again into a political and economic colony of the empire, that is what they really pretend.... Capitalism... is destroying half the world but that is the project of *majunchismo*, [referring to the USA] you do not see that they are talking about ending it, well they propose the control of oil by an entity other than the government, that is, privatization, they in the little they say there, return the land to the landowners, privatize the nationalized companies again, provide facilities for international investment, etc., that is the bourgeois capitalist project.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>135</sup>

Additional subcategory of the section of *crisis identification*, focuses on the solution for the crisis; hence this subcategory is titled as *solutions*. Chávez offered

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<sup>132</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC07] SEPTEMBER 15, 2012 - SPEECH - SAN FERNANDO, APURE. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 201

<sup>133</sup> \_\_ [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. \_\_ p. 106

<sup>134</sup> \_\_ [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. \_\_ p. 91

<sup>135</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, pp. 72, 79, 80

solutions that only he can carry out, as the main spokesperson for “the people.” Among these pledges offered by Chávez, was the welfare provided by socialism standards:

(80) The second great historical objective is.... socialism, continue building, because we are not starting from scratch, no, you could not say build socialism, no, continue, because until now we have been building bases, still very incipient, of the Venezuelan road to socialism as someone would say, or of the Venezuelan socialism of the 21st century to be more specific, continue building the socialism of the 21st century in Venezuela.... It also has to do with the spiritual, the ethical, the spiritual bases of socialism.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>136</sup>

To prove his point, Chávez continued to offer solutions to the Venezuelan crisis by citing examples of other states that had embraced socialism:

(81) In Bolivia, for example, they had even privatized the water from the springs, even the rivers, until the revolution led by the fellow President Evo Morales arrived, and much of the management of natural resources that belongs to the Bolivian people has been recovered. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>137</sup>

Chávez presented his plans and projects to address the crisis:

(82) What is our project? .... is fully operational, the Bolivarian Constitution, the Bolivarian project, the First Socialist Plan of the Nation, which we are rounding off this year 2012, to open the new cycle 2013-2019.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>138</sup>

Chávez demonstrated certainty and clear objectives to solve the crisis:

(83) Now, with a lot of organization, scientific planning, discussion of the government program, listening carefully, don't forget about the five great historical objectives, the national objectives, the strategic objectives and now you have to feed them from the bases to get to the detail I am going to give you an example of the program.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>139</sup>

And of course, Chávez created awareness of the problems and solutions he proposed as part of his government plan:

(84) The life of the collective, to depoliticize something would be to take the heart out of something if it is human, if it is social, ah, if it

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<sup>136</sup> \_\_ [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. \_\_ p. 71

<sup>137</sup> \_\_ [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. pp. 85-86

<sup>138</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC01] MARCH 16, 2012 - SPEECH - CARACAS INT. AIRPOT. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 6

<sup>139</sup> \_\_ [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. \_\_ p. 115

is asocial or antisocial then yes we can say that it is antipolitical or apolitical, so be careful when someone walks around saying no that there is that PDVSA must be depoliticized, that housing must be depoliticized, that the economy must be depoliticized, oh well, it is good to know what that expression and that idea mean and what is hidden behind it, uh, it is the denial of the State, it is the denial of the collective is the denial of the Constitution.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>140</sup>

The last subcategory in this section is *agents of crisis*. Chávez exposed those responsible for Venezuela's problems, beginning with the opposition groups, the elite. Chávez constantly accused them of destabilizing the country and using violent means to destroy "the people:"

(85) We have an opposition that represents the most extreme right-wing Venezuelan upper class that is trying to deceive the people with a hidden package, with a false program. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>141</sup>

Chávez created these enemy agents by blaming actors of all kinds. He included in his speeches US-led imperialism, the bourgeoisie, the right wing, the capitalists, and neoliberals:

(86) The *yankee* empire, the CIA, international intelligence bodies, the bourgeoisie and the international right, large international media corporations, large companies, transnationals are behind the campaign of the Venezuelan right, a stateless right. That is why we must be attentive, because it is not just any battle, no, we are risking the life of the Bolivarian Revolution, we are risking the life of the future, we are risking the homeland of our sons, of our daughters, of our grandchildren.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>142</sup>

(87) They are the most disastrous past, capitalism, neoliberalism, the package deal. Here we are in Apure, what do they propose in the package? Return the lands, they say they were illegally stolen from their owners, the latifundio! (Chávez, 2012)<sup>143</sup>

(88) Caracas was too mistreated by capitalism.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>144</sup>

Chávez did not miss the opportunity to blame the old regime that ruled Venezuela in the past:

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<sup>140</sup> \_\_ [HC06] AUGUST 17, 2012 - SPEECH - SAN AGUSTIN, DC. \_\_ p. 133

<sup>141</sup> \_\_ [HC07] SEPTEMBER 15, 2012 - SPEECH - SAN FERNANDO, APURE. \_\_ p. 200

<sup>142</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC02] MARCH 17, 2012 - SPEECH - ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANDIDACY - VARGAS. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 16

<sup>143</sup> \_\_ [HC07] SEPTEMBER 15, 2012 - SPEECH - SAN FERNANDO, APURE. \_\_ p. 192

<sup>144</sup> \_\_ [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. \_\_ p. 116

(89) The Venezuela back in the 90s, when they governed, because there it is true that there were millions of people starving in Venezuela, millions, and that was one of the causes precisely of the *Caracazo*<sup>145</sup>, hunger, hunger, malnutrition children, infant mortality, unemployment, misery, while they filled their pockets, while they accumulated great wealth by exploiting and stealing the wealth of the people.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>146</sup>

#### 4.5.2. Donald Trump

Trump identified two crises, one internal and one external, the first crisis being almost an excuse to make evident the second crisis. For Trump aspects such as America's immigration policies and political corruption threatened the jobs and lives of American citizens. According to Trump's narrative, these aspects revealed an internal social and security crisis. Trump identified the internal crisis as a bridge to what worried him the most: the image and position of the USA in the world. Trump wanted to recover the USA's glorious days that were being overshadowed by a decline in the exposed crisis. Problems like the USA's weakening influence over other nations of the world, the USA's ability to make good deals with other nations, the USA's status quo, the USA's anti-terrorist global image, among other things that did not define the true American supremacy. After Trump defined internal and external crises, he exposed the enemy entities that caused these crises. Trump identified the agents of the crisis by name and surname, in a negative and disrespectful manner. Trump included the media and wealthy donors inside the group of agents that caused the crises. Parallel to the crisis exposure, Trump also offered solutions that consisted in the execution of new plans, and agreements to continue protecting not only American resources but also the global image.

Trump offered solutions that were intended to fix the problems left behind by the establishment. Apparently, Trump's presidential campaign promoted a change starting from domestic problems to help "make America great again" on the international arena as well. The first subcategory in this section is *problems exposure*. Trump clearly identified an internal immigration crisis, national security crisis, corruption crisis and labor crisis:

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<sup>145</sup> ...violent clashes between police and protesters... in the Venezuelan capital, Caracas....  
Source: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-12593085>

<sup>146</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 105

(90) Right now, however, we're in the middle of a job's crisis, a border crisis and a terrorism crisis like never before.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>147</sup>

Trump exposed an external crisis that also affected the American people:

(91) Our roads and bridges are falling apart, our airports are third-world condition, and 43 million Americans are on food stamps. Now, let us consider the state of affairs abroad. Not only have our citizens endured domestic disaster, but they've lived through one international humiliation after another, one after another.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>148</sup>

Trump pointed to the crisis of the USA global authority in the fight against terrorism:

(92) In the 20th century the United States has defeated fascism, Nazism and communism. Now a different threat challenges our world. Radical Islamic terrorism. This summer there's been an ISIS attack launched outside the war zones of the Middle East, hard to believe, every 84 hours. Here in America, we have seen one brutal attack after another.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>149</sup>

Trump assured that the international policies of the establishment affected the USA hegemony:

(93) You cannot have a foreign policy without diplomacy. A superpower understands that caution and restraint are really truly signs of strength. Although not in government service, I was totally against the war in Iraq, very proudly, saying for many years that it would destabilize the Middle East. Sadly, I was correct, and the biggest beneficiary has been Iran, who is systematically taking over Iraq and gaining access to their very rich oil reserves, something it has wanted to do for decades. (Trump, 2016)<sup>150</sup>

Trump remarked that the image of an America that made good deals and agreements in the past had been damaged by the enemy elite:

(94) We have the most incompetently worked trade deals ever negotiated probably in the history of the world, and that starts with

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<sup>147</sup> [DT05] AUGUST 31, 2016 - SPEECH - IMMIGRATION - PHOENIX. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, p. 85

<sup>148</sup> [DT03] JULY 21, 2016 - SPEECH - REP. NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE - OH. \_\_ p. 31

<sup>149</sup> [DT04] AUGUST 15, 2016 - SPEECH WITH MIKE PENCE - UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT - YOUNGSTOWN, OH. \_\_ p. 52

<sup>150</sup> [DT01] APRIL 27, 2016 - SPEECH - FOREIGN POLICY - WASHINGTON DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, p. 11

NAFTA. And now they want to go TPP, one of the great disasters.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>151</sup>

(95) Our horrible trade agreements with China and many others will be totally renegotiated.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>152</sup>

Trump was also concerned of the USA status-quo crisis:

(96) Our country looks bad to the world, especially when we are supposed to be the world's leader. How can we lead when we can't even control our own cities? (Trump, 2016)<sup>153</sup>

The second subcategory is called *agents of crisis*. Here, Trump repeatedly highlighted the groups responsible for this unprecedented internal and external crisis, starting for the politicians, the corrupt elite:

(97) It's not just our economy that's been corrupted, but our foreign policy too. The Hillary Clinton foreign policy has cost America thousands of lives and trillions and trillions of dollars and unleashed ISIS across the world. No Secretary of State been more wrong.... than Hillary Clinton.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>154</sup>

Trump included the establishment's policies towards immigration and terrorism:

(98) The rise of ISIS is the direct result of policy decisions made by President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton.... Fast forward to today. What we have, and think of this, and the decisions made by the Obama/Clinton group have been absolutely disastrous. Libya is in ruins. Our ambassador and three other really brave Americans are dead. And ISIS has gained a new base of operations. Syria is in the midst of a disastrous civil war. ISIS controls large portions of territory. A refugee crisis now threatens Europe and the United States.... In short, the Obama/ Clinton foreign policy has unleashed ISIS, destabilized the Middle East, and put the nation of Iran, which chants, "death to America", in a dominant position of regional power and in fact aspiring a dominant world power.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>155</sup>

Finally, Trump included in this group the mass media as agents of misinformation and donors as agents that financed the crisis:

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<sup>151</sup> [DT05] AUGUST 31, 2016 - SPEECH - IMMIGRATION - PHOENIX. \_\_ p.82

<sup>152</sup> [DT03] JULY 21, 2016 - SPEECH - REP. NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE - OH. \_\_ p. 44

<sup>153</sup> [DT06] SEPTEMBER 22, 2016 - SPEECH - PLAN FOR AMERICAN ENERGY - PITTSBURG. \_\_ p.90

<sup>154</sup> [DT02] JUNE 22, 2016 - SPEECH - THE STAKES OF THE ELECTION - NY. \_\_ p.19

<sup>155</sup> [DT04] AUGUST 15, 2016 - SPEECH WITH MIKE PENCE - UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT - YOUNGSTOWN, OH. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches.p. 54

(99) These people, the world's most dishonest people, the media, they are not happy. No, no.... Isn't it too bad that the corrupt media never show the crowds? .... (Trump, 2016)<sup>156</sup>

(100) Big business, elite media and major donors are lining up behind the campaign of my opponent because they know she will keep our rigged system in place.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>157</sup>

(101) The fundamental problem with the immigration system in our country is that it serves the needs of wealthy donors, political activists and powerful, powerful politicians.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>158</sup>

The last subcategory is *solutions*. Here Trump mentioned the proposals to solve both internal and external crises. One of Trump's solutions was based on promoting the advantages of the USA philosophy as a plan to recover the global image:

(102) Our system of government and our American culture is the best in the world and will produce the best outcomes for all who adopt them.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>159</sup>

Trump promoted the creation of new-better policies and international agreements:

(103) We must develop a foreign policy based on American interests.... Our foreign policy goals must be based on America's core national security interests.... Fixing our relations with China is another important step, and really toward creating an even more prosperous period of time.... Our goal is peace and prosperity, not war and destruction. The best way to achieve those goals is through a disciplined, deliberate and consistent foreign policy.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>160</sup>

Trump expressed his plans to solve internal and external crises:

(104) We need a long-term plan to halt the spread and reach of radical Islam. Containing the spread of radical Islam must be a major foreign policy goal of the United States and indeed the world.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> [DT08] NOVEMBER 7, 2016 - SPEECH - GRAND RAPIDS. \_\_ pp. 150, 155

<sup>157</sup> [DT03] JULY 21, 2016 - SPEECH - REP. NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE - OH. \_\_ p. 33

<sup>158</sup> [DT05] AUGUST 31, 2016 - SPEECH - IMMIGRATION - PHOENIX. \_\_ p. 68

<sup>159</sup> [DT04] AUGUST 15, 2016 - SPEECH WITH MIKE PENCE - UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT - YOUNGSTOWN, OH. \_\_ p. 66

<sup>160</sup> [DT01] APRIL 27, 2016 - SPEECH - FOREIGN POLICY - WASHINGTON DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, pp. 9, 10

<sup>161</sup> [DT01] APRIL 27, 2016 - SPEECH - FOREIGN POLICY - WASHINGTON DC. \_\_ p. 6

(105) We have a great economic plan. We will double our growth and have the strongest economy anywhere in the world. At the same time, we will get along with all other nations willing to get along with us. We will be.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>162</sup>

Lastly, Trump wanted to apply protectionist measures, such as his interest in defending jobs that belonged to the Americans:

(106) Let's protect our social security and Medicare. Let's get unemployed Americans off the welfare and back to work in their own country.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>163</sup>

#### 4.6. People Mobilization

This category was one of the most fascinating in this research, since Chávez and Trump used manipulation, not just to keep “the people” on their side, but to add other individuals to their exclusive group of people. This manipulation technique was employed by Chávez and Trump to mobilize the largest number of individuals, regardless of whether the person would become a loyal supporter or not. Nevertheless, it did mark a turning point to define the connection between Chávez, Trump, and their followers. In different degrees Chávez and Trump promised to grant independence to “the people” and improve the situation of the marginalized in Venezuelan and American society respectively, hence these promises were also extended for everyone who were affected by the actions of the Venezuela's, America's enemy elite. The emotional influence of Trump's and Chávez's speeches went through a roller coaster of feelings. Their narrative conveyed love, joy, and hate. They aroused pride, fear, intolerance, anger, and competitiveness, mixed with degrees of empathy, positivism, motivation, and trust.

Although both Chávez and Trump had precisely the same objective of mobilizing the people, their influence procedures were based on different cultural aspects. The economic model of each respective country and the problems that derived from it also differed. The power Chávez and Trump offered to give back to people were distinguished by their left-wing or right-wing ideology. Although their vision of government was not the same either, this narrative brought Chávez and Trump closer to “the people” and other groups of Venezuelan and American society.

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<sup>162</sup> [DT09] NOVEMBER 9, 2016 - VICTORY SPEECH. \_\_ p. 167

<sup>163</sup> [DT05] AUGUST 31, 2016 - SPEECH - IMMIGRATION - PHOENIX. \_\_ p. 89

#### 4.6.1. Hugo Chávez

Chávez's people mobilization process was very effective. This was because the degree of his narrative was informal enough to articulate stronger feelings. The threats were recurrent in Chávez messages, but he made those threat messages "tolerable" since he aroused feelings of pride and nationalism too. Chávez offered power to "the people" through social missions. The social missions addressed the food, education, health, among other needs of all Venezuelans since it was not limited only to the poor. Chávez assured that anyone could benefit from socialist markets, free education programs, free community health centers, and virtually all other aid proposed by his government. This may have caused the middle class to reconsider who they would support in the 2012 Venezuelan presidential elections. Chávez's approach used to mobilize individuals was also based on institutionalist ideas, to give the voice back to "the people" and provide an imaginary closeness to the country's executive leadership. Chávez took advantage of the political ignorance of "the people" to voluntarily influence their emotions. He aroused a resentment based on the oppression that Venezuela experienced two centuries before by the colonizing forces of the Spanish empire. Consequently, he promoted feelings of revolution against a new ruling empire - the USA- that was destroying the Bolivarian identity of the country.

For Chávez it was not enough to identify "the people", but also to ensure he could mobilize them towards the direction he wanted them to go. Chávez exposed a need for Venezuelans to free themselves from the imperialism. That need was not inherent only to the group of people made up of the poor, it was extended to all Venezuelans. The first subcategory in this section is *emotional manipulation*. Chávez's ambition of mobilization is achieved while implementing the constant manipulation of people's emotions such as happiness, fear, anger, love:

(107) What do you think would happen to the Barrio Adentro Mission, what do you think would happen to the Cuban doctors? They would kick them out. What do you think they would do with the *Petrocasafactory*? The most likely thing is that they privatize or abandon it, what do you think they would do with the Rivas Mission, with the Sucre Mission? They would eliminate them. Do you think that a Majunche government would promote, for example, the Great Mission in Amor Mayor? The Great Mission Sons and Sons of Venezuela, pensions, agricultural credits? Land reclamation? All that would be thrown back... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>164</sup>

(108) every day more feelings of love, of love, a song of love that I share from my heart with all of you, dear Venezuelans, of love, of love for this country, of love for this people, of love for you; And that love, precisely, is the greatest of the forces that have me standing here

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<sup>164</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC07] SEPTEMBER 15, 2012 - SPEECH - SAN FERNANDO, APURE. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 203

and will continue to support me in the fight for life, to continue building ourselves in love, the homeland of love. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>165</sup>

(109) I am very happy to be able to stand here today to once again fulfill my pledged word, I am going to proceed to sign the new Organic Labor Law for workers.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>166</sup>

(110) We are going to give the bourgeoisie a hard beating. (Chávez, 2012)<sup>167</sup>

Chávez frequently aroused feelings of loyalty, unity, and pride:

(111) we have to work very hard, very united.... From there, from there the need to strengthen unity, internal unity, with absolute loyalty, with the people and with the Revolution.... but always united in strategy and loyal in action.... I have always said it, criticize me but be loyal to your government, loyal to the Revolution.... Let's do the job together.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>168</sup>

(112) I was always aware of the events of each day, of each night and how proud I am, how proud, I am overflowing with national pride, with pride, with positive feelings, to look from there at how the Venezuelan people continue together with their government, deployed in the struggle, building the Simón Bolívar National Project.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>169</sup>

Chávez emboldened Venezuelans using victimization:

(113) Looking at that history in perspective, it tells us that no conquest of the peoples, no conquest of the workers and workers has occurred without there having been a long process of resistance, struggle, and even suffering.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>170</sup>

Chávez fostered nationalism:

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<sup>165</sup> \_\_ [HC01] MARCH 16, 2012 - SPEECH - CARACAS INT. AIRPOT. \_\_ p. 3

<sup>166</sup> \_\_ [HC03] APRIL 30, 2012 - SPEECH - NEW LABOR LAW – CARACAS. \_\_p. 38

<sup>167</sup> \_\_ [HC08] OCTOBER 4, 2012 - SPEECH - CAMPAING CLOUSURE - CARACAS, DC. \_\_ p. 221

<sup>168</sup> \_\_ [HC02] MARCH 17, 2012 - SPEECH – ANNOUN. OF THE CANDIDACY - VARGAS. \_\_ pp. 16, 17, 20, 21

<sup>169</sup> \_\_ [HC01] MARCH 16, 2012 - SPEECH - CARACAS INT. AIRPOT. \_\_ p. 4

<sup>170</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC03] APRIL 30, 2012 - SPEECH - NEW LABOR LAW – CARACAS. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 32

(114) Long live Venezuela! .... Venezuela today is free and will never again be a colony for anyone! Venezuela today regained its independence.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>171</sup>

And Chávez addressed the problems of the common citizen with empathy, unpretentiousness, clarity, and positivism:

(115) Let's go to work; And I don't care if they support this one, or support the other, no, as long as the laws are respected, see, the laws and we work honestly....

(116) I understand that you, all the families that came out of that situation of terrible uncertainty are incorporated into the project, right? Aha, and well, everything related to financing is solved.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>172</sup>

(117) I am truly sorry, and I say it with a lot of humility, with a lot of faith, with a lot of feeling, that one has come through those paths of life by the hand, by the hand of God.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>173</sup>

(118) We have to definitively and forever neutralize that hatred [coming from the opposition] and those negative feelings with that love, and with this positive spirit.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>174</sup>

The second subcategory inside the *mobilization of the people* main category is established through the guarantees of political participation offered to “the people” as a way of recovering their power in society. This subcategory is *institutional manipulation*. “The institutions are considered as resources of the agents and rational actors to obtain the achievement of their objectives.”<sup>175</sup> Chávez executed this institutionalist agenda by making constant propaganda to the social missions proposed by his administration:

(119) Greetings to all the institutions that make life in these ghettos, such as the Fire Department, the Civil Protection, the doctors, nurses, hospital nurses, the Popular Clinic of *El Valle*, the CDI, the popular consultants of *Barrio Adentro* [inside the ghetto] Greetings to all the workers, the leaders of the social missions and the great missions in *El Valle, Coche*. .... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> \_\_ [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. \_\_ p. 101

<sup>172</sup> \_\_ [HC06] AUGUST 17, 2012 - SPEECH - SAN AGUSTIN, DC. \_\_ pp. 147, 179

<sup>173</sup> \_\_ [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. \_\_ p. 87

<sup>174</sup> \_\_ [HC02] MARCH 17, 2012 - SPEECH - ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANDIDACY - VARGAS. \_\_ p. 14

<sup>175</sup> Source: <https://www.uv.mx/iiesca/files/2012/12/perspectivas2008-1.pdf> p. 47

<sup>176</sup> Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC05] JULY 26, 2012 - SPEECH - EL VALLE, DC. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez's speeches, p. 99

Chávez included “the people” in new social projects:

(120) Great Mission Housing Venezuela.... We are going to start signing, right, Rafael? We are going to sign, some families, not all, right? Because how many are going to *Fuerte Tiuna*. Seven hundred and something. Let’s sing... Well hopefully you can move in December. Well, who else is going to sign? Aha Mrs. Mercedes. How are you, Mercedes? .... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>177</sup>

Chávez relayed his narrative on the advances of “the Bolivarian revolution:”

(121) Thanks to the revolution and today the whole town is fed in a dignified way, the boys, the girls, the Venezuelan family, but here 20 years ago there was hunger, poverty and misery. Look, in just 10 years we have reduced poverty by more than half, but in the next 6 years we must bring misery to zero in the Homeland of Bolívar.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>178</sup>

Chávez offered justice to “the people” through the nationalization of companies that exploited the country’s natural resources:

(122) They stole what belonged to the people for 100 years, now Venezuelan wealth is wealth for the people, well-being for the people, development for the people, not for the bourgeoisie.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>179</sup>

Chávez built a national image of progress, change and social power:

(123) No one is going to get us off that path, because the spiritual force is too much and the material force is too much, that is, the moral power, the spiritual power belongs to millions of us, the physical and material power is too great, and we have to continue to strengthen it and national power will continue to grow in all spheres.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>180</sup>

Chávez manifested a constant interest in providing control of institutions to “the people” as true bearers of power in Venezuela:

(124) Popular power, communal power, worker power, peasant power. That is why it is so important to continue consolidating that popular power, and with it, to continue giving life to the new

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<sup>177</sup> \_\_ [HC06] AUGUST 17, 2012 - SPEECH - SAN AGUSTIN, DC. \_\_ pp. 164, 183

<sup>178</sup> \_\_ [HC08] OCTOBER 4, 2012 - SPEECH - CAMPAING CLOUSURE - CARACAS, DC. \_\_ p. 223

<sup>179</sup> \_\_ [HC02] MARCH 17, 2012 - SPEECH - ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANDIDACY - VARGAS. \_\_ p. 23

<sup>180</sup> \_\_ [HC01] MARCH 16, 2012 - SPEECH - CARACAS INT. AIRPOT. \_\_ p. 7

revolutionary, socialist, popular hegemony.... transferring more power to the people.... (Chávez, 2012)<sup>181</sup>

#### 4.6.2. Donald Trump

Trump displayed a fearless ability to promote American identity along with emotional manipulation techniques inside the *people mobilization* category. For instance, the clearest case was his allegation about the job threat that “all” Americans were facing in 2016. Trump always referred to the degree of social responsibility the Americans citizens had to face this problem, and he firmly stated that jobs belonging to the American people had to be protected at all costs. Trump argued that if he lost the election, those jobs would also disappear, and Americans would go down the path of poverty. On the other hand, the way Trump persisted to arouse fear in people was by exposing specific cases of civilians who lost family members in the hands of alien criminals. Trump then stated that if his opponent won the elections, the streets of the country would be full of criminals of all kinds, tearing apart the American families. At one point, his discriminatory speech became evident, therefore he had to use arguments that touched all classes of citizens regardless of their race, sex, class, religion, and roots. Trump knew that even if they didn’t fit his definition of “people,” they still had the rights in American society, and he had to reach out to them as well.

Trump sought closeness exploiting the identity issues and feelings of the American people. The first subcategory in Trump’s case is *emotional manipulation*. Trump used the feelings in an attempt to connect with his fellow Americans. He delivered phrases that incited hatred and fear, combined with other statements that showed “love”:

(125) I love people of Arizona and together we are going to win the White House in November.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>182</sup>

(126) They support the release of dangerous, dangerous, dangerous, criminals from detention. And, they support unconstitutional executive amnesty. Hillary Clinton has pledged amnesty in her first 100 days, and her plan will provide Obamacare, Social Security, and Medicare for illegal immigrants, breaking the federal budget. On top of that, she promises uncontrolled, low-skilled immigration that continues to reduce jobs and wages for American workers.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>181</sup>Word-for-word translation of the transcript of [HC04] JUNE 11, 2012 - SPEECH - INSCRIPTION OF THE CANDIDACY - DC. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Hugo Chávez’s speeches, pp. 72, 79

<sup>182</sup>[DT05] AUGUST 31, 2016 - SPEECH - IMMIGRATION - PHOENIX. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump’s speeches, p. 67

<sup>183</sup>[DT06] SEPTEMBER 22, 2016 - SPEECH - PLAN FOR AMERICAN ENERGY - PITTSBURG. Source: M. Bervis’s thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump’s speeches, p.71

(127) You've been mistreated.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>184</sup>

Trump appealed to expose feelings of pride:

(128) We would have a country that you would be so proud of. You would even be proud of it.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>185</sup>

Although it was selective, Trump showed empathy:

(129) We are going to be considerate and compassionate to everyone, but my greatest compassion will be for our own struggling citizens.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>186</sup>

Trump also expressed his unwillingness to accept a "bad behavior" in American society:

(130) Zero tolerance for criminal aliens. Zero. Zero.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>187</sup>

Trump aroused feelings of victimization, also as a way to camouflage his discriminatory speech:

(131) The African-American community, the Hispanic community has been treated horribly for a long time.... You have one magnificent chance to beat this corrupt, rigged system and to deliver justice for every forgotten man and forgotten woman and forgotten child in this nation. We are fighting for every citizen who believes that government should serve the people, not the donors and not the special interests.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>188</sup>

Trump promoted feelings of competitiveness:

(132) Strong border controls will also protect our workers and save our budget trillions in the long-term. It is perhaps the most pro-growth economic plan anywhere in American history. I think it is. Compare that to my opponent. She plans a \$1.3 trillion dollar tax hike, massive new regulations, and some of your industry is sitting right in this room are out of business, the offshoring of American jobs, and the aggressive restriction of American energy production. Her plan will help

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<sup>184</sup> [DT08] NOVEMBER 7, 2016 - SPEECH - GRAND RAPIDS. \_\_ p. 151

<sup>185</sup> [DT07] OCTOBER 19, 2016 - DEBATE #3. \_\_ p. 123

<sup>186</sup> [DT03] JULY 21, 2016 - SPEECH - REP. NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE - OH. p. 41

<sup>187</sup> [DT05] AUGUST 31, 2016 - SPEECH - IMMIGRATION - PHOENIX. \_\_ p. 73

<sup>188</sup> [DT08] NOVEMBER 7, 2016 - SPEECH - GRAND RAPIDS. \_\_ pp. 160, 164

only her wealthy donors, and global special interests, who benefit from the rigged system.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>189</sup>

And Trump encouraged feelings of trust:

(133) She will absolutely pass it, which will destroy the rest of the auto industry. Believe me.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>190</sup>

The second and final subcategory is *exploiting people's identity concepts*. In his eagerness to mobilize large masses, Trump exploited the elements of the American identity. An article about the American identity of the University of Colorado Boulder says that "even though all Americans, as Americans, share the same national identification, the normative content of that identity can vary greatly across groups."<sup>191</sup> Inside the article is argued that social identity derives from people's need to belong to a group in society. This belonging to a social group is in turn limited by certain rules/stereotypes. Finally, stereotypes arise from ideas endorsed by the elite, and normally fall on individual attributes, such as racial, religious legacy, among others. Trump's narrative raised issues of race and ethnicity:

(134) Decades of record immigration have produced lower wages and higher unemployment for our citizens, especially for African American and Latino workers. We are going to have an immigration system that works, but one that works for the American people.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>192</sup>

Trump also exposed other groups under threats that were not addressed before:

(135) My administration will speak out against the oppression of women, gays and people of different beliefs.... This includes speaking out against the horrible practice of honor killings, where women are murdered by their relatives for dressing, marrying or acting in a way that violates fundamentalist teachings.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>193</sup>

Trump included in his narrative all citizens affected by the 2016 job crisis:

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<sup>189</sup> [DT06] SEPTEMBER 22, 2016 - SPEECH - PLAN FOR AMERICAN ENERGY - PITTSBURG. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, p.94

<sup>190</sup> [DT08] NOVEMBER 7, 2016 - SPEECH - GRAND RAPIDS. \_\_ p. 159

<sup>191</sup> Ryan Dawkins, U.S. Air Force Academy. Source: <https://www.colorado.edu/center/benson/western-civilization/summer-institute/summer-institute-essays/one-american-identity-two-distinct>

<sup>192</sup> [DT03] JULY 21, 2016 - SPEECH - REP. NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE - OH. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, p. 39

<sup>193</sup> [DT04] AUGUST 15, 2016 - SPEECH WITH MIKE PENCE – UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT - YOUNGSTOWN, OH. \_\_ p. 61

(136) The first victims of her radical policies will be poor African- American and Hispanic workers who need jobs.... I will change immigration rules to give unemployed Americans an opportunity to fill good, really good paying jobs.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>194</sup>

Trump included people affected by security crisis:

(137) The first task for our new administration will be to liberate our citizens from the crime and terrorism and lawlessness that threatens our communities.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>195</sup>

Finally, Trump called out all those who have American qualities and characteristics<sup>196</sup>:

(138) Americans. Americans, the people that we love. Americans. America First. Make our country great again. Americans are going to start believing in the future of our country.... (Trump, 2016)<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> [DT02] JUNE 22, 2016 - SPEECH - THE STAKES OF THE ELECTION - NY. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, pp. 23, 24

<sup>195</sup> [DT03] JULY 21, 2016 - SPEECH - REP. NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE - OH. \_\_ p. 36

<sup>196</sup> Americanness. Source: <https://www.yourdictionary.com/amicanness>

<sup>197</sup> [DT02] JUNE 22, 2016 - SPEECH - THE STAKES OF THE ELECTION - NY. Source: M. Bervis's thesis Journal - Transcript of Donald Trump's speeches, p. 27

## 5. ARGUMENT

Having described the data analysis in detail, this section highlights the main findings. First of all, it was found that the populist leader acts following a series of guidelines that finally lead him to establish a bond with the people. These guidelines or mechanisms are practically based on the effective modeling of concepts in the people's imaginary by the leader. Moreover, these mechanisms also ensure the mobilization of populist supporters. Following Chávez and Trump cases, it was determined that although they come from different contexts, both understood the importance of mobilizing the people to achieve their political goals. That is why they settle in developing the concepts of "me," "us" and "them". The leader, the people, and the elite respectively. In the case of "the people" and "the elite" concepts, these are not assembled separately, rather one draws on the other. The creation of the concept of elite goes through the categorization of the people by the populist leader, or through the identification of a crisis referred to the agents that provoked it. For instance, when Chávez and Trump were talking about the elite and their "evil" values, they were also constructing relevant concepts such as the people, the crisis, and their own image as leaders.

The research confirmed that the populist leader effectively makes an invention of the people in line with the context. He/she builds "the people" and "the elite" concepts within a set of aims that include building himself/herself as the people's voice. In this activity, the populist leader narrates the virtues that unite him and make him part of the people. Related to this topic, it was possible to observe in Chávez and Trump cases the frequent use of idioms and popular jargon in their speeches, domination of relevant and popular topics, and the preaching of values similar to those of their target audience. In the case of "the leader" concept, populists such as Chávez and Trump developed an idealized conceptualization of the leader in their respective realities, emphasizing their outsider status to corrupt Venezuelan and US politics respectively. Something that Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) call *outsiders*, within the framework of populist types. The emphasis on their own personal qualities was essential in the construction of the leader, the people and the bond between them. Inside the mechanisms for the construction of the leader-people bond, it was found that the creation of the concept of the leader by the populists is undoubtedly as important as the concept of the people itself.

Second, the charisma feature in populist leaders plays a key role in the leader-people bond construction. In Chávez's and Trump's speeches, there was a deliberate attempt to construct a bond with the people through the use of attention-grabbing styles, strategies and ideologies. In this vein, populist leaders mobilized their faithful followers as well as the opposition sectors and the undecided voters. This finding corroborates well with the literature that puts emphasis on the leader's charisma for the rise of the populist leaders (Di Tella, 1997; Weyland, 2001; Jansen, 2011; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Regarding the marks found in the speeches of the populist leaders, it was verified that these mostly come from "the ability to attract the attention and admiration" of the people "to be seen as a leader."<sup>198</sup> Evidently, those marks do not rely on the same methods, forms or words. For this reason, although as mechanisms

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<sup>198</sup> Source: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/charisma>

they can be seen as similar, their content is built within the ideological and social framework of the populist actor. This means that each populist leader applies charismatic techniques to develop concepts according to the context and their own ideas. Those concepts will allow populist leaders to effectively create a bond with the people.

Third, it was found that the populist leader discusses his own capabilities with a crisis situation. This means that the exposure of a crisis, whether internal or external to the country, becomes the basis of a populist narrative that seeks to form a connection with the people. By exposing the crisis, an almost imminent need to find a solution to it is born. It is then where the populist develops the concept of “the leader” as part of the solution to the crisis that threatens the country. Identifying a crisis is perhaps one of the most developed mechanisms in the case studies of this research. This finding leads to think that the problems become advantages for the populist candidates in search of the election. For populist leaders, all problems have solutions, but these solutions can only be offered by them. Without a crisis, there is no need to look for solutions, which is why so much effort is devoted to creating or evidence of a crisis in the populist narrative.

Fourth, it was also corroborated that populist figures made use of emotions to connect with the people so that they can get their trust and mobilize them. It was evidenced in the analysis of the speeches of this study, that the populist leader seeks to generate closeness with the people through the expression of similar preferences with the people. Emotions were evoked in all of the codes, yet they were better connected with the leader’s performance when the analysis focused on the non-verbal communication. The performance of the populist character includes a sort of interpretation that resembles the tastes of the people. For example, these may be the public executions of acts where the populist leader dresses, eats, and sings the same songs as the people. “In order to prove that the leader is one of the people, he or she must establish and maintain a deep personal and emotional connection with them. This is symbolically well expressed by physical contact between the leader and the people” (Diehl, 2019, p. 127).

Fifth, it was also possible to confirm the use of an anti-system, anti-plural, anti-elite style in the populist actors’ narrative (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Müller, 2016; Oliver & Rahn, 2016). Anti-people considerations were built, thinking about the enemies—the opposition and the corrupt elite—. According to the populist cases studied, the anti-people group always returned to their corrupt practices. The institutions and decisions of the establishment reflected a deep crisis. Consequently, populist candidates’ narrative style turns to blame these entities that caused the problematic situation that their countries were going through. With repeated references to this common enemy, they tried to relate to the people and create group solidarity, with the aim of attacking the threat together. This rhetorical resource implicitly requires the figure of a savior type of leader; besides that it seems to be a key mark to connect with the people, who at this point demand someone to save them from the adversary.

Sixth, the promises within the populist narrative, among other things, are factors that strengthen the bond between the populist leader and the people. Promises such as liberation from the oppression imposed by the elites and the establishment, were among the most pronounced by the populist leaders studied in this thesis. These promises have

a seemingly immediate action, and are characterized by phrases like; “today,” “now,” “from now on,” among others. This alteration of the concept of time is evidenced as part of the populist leader’s narrative mechanisms. It consists of making believe that the change people need can be achieved almost immediately, or in a very short period of time. This in turn becomes a way of mobilizing people through emotional manipulation.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

After the study and the reflective immersion into Chávez's and Trump's speeches, it is possible to elucidate how the relationship between the populist leader and the people is built in the light of this study's findings. A series of conclusions can be made about the implications of the focus on the leader-people bond for studies on populism.

The populist leader-people bond arose as the result of at least five reoccurring mechanisms, mainly incorporated by the leader in his/her speeches. These mechanisms or guidelines can happen simultaneously and without a specific order. These mechanisms are: self-construction as "the leader," non-verbal communication, construction of "the people" as the leading concept, identification of a crisis, and mobilization of the people. These, in turn, lead to sub-mechanisms that are effectively built by communicative patterns present in the populist's narrative. These sub-mechanisms are neither fixed nor exclusive of the main ones. In turn, these sub-mechanisms reflect different dimensions (ideology, style, and strategy) of the populist phenomenon. This means that each populist leader makes unique use of those ideological elements, styles, and strategies to effectively connect with his/her followers. The usability of the dimensions will depend on [1] the economic, social, and cultural context in which a populist figure is formed, [2] its approach, ideology, and political formation, and finally [3] the ability to influence the political and social setting of a nation.

By taking the central mechanisms found in the populist leaders' narrative, it was confirmed that the reason for this bond to be effectively built is based on the interaction between the two factions: the people and the leader (Jansen, 2011; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Casullo, 2019; among others). Although this "interaction" seems to materialize in a unidirectional way, it develops as follows; in the first place, it begins because there is a group of people who, being "neglected" by governments, have a high level of vulnerability. This incapacity of resistance on the part of the people allows populist leader figures to agitate them by generating concepts in the social imaginary about who the real people are and why they are being dismissed. Moreover, the vulnerability of this group of people allows the leader to amplify a crisis blaming an evil entity as the main cause of the problem. That action of the populist leader automatically will cause a "reasonable" demand on the people's side. That demand will be attended by the populist leader who also took advantage of creating a "messianic/heroic" image of himself/herself. The public appearances of the populist actor at different moments before the presidential elections are the causal instrument of the final outcome, which is the leader-people bond formation. It is through the populist leaders' speeches that this interaction begins to make sense, and to gain strength.

Once reviewing the key findings of this study, centered on this research, and supporting Diehl's (2019) view, as part of the conclusions, a discussion on the conceptual definition of populism can also be made. On the basis of the findings, it seems it is possible to define populism as a calculated and invasive political practice that manifested in different dimensions. Further it aims to create a powerful connection with sensitive factions of a society and achieve the exercise of hegemony. It is

“calculated” because it is planned “to produce a particular effect.”<sup>199</sup> This effect can be summed up as a transition of power from the elite to the people. Although this phenomenon theoretically seeks the common good, populist behavior is purely instrumental, which means that in its actions, directly or indirectly, it always seeks its own benefit. On the other hand, it is invasive because it is related to a constant demand and imposition of power. The term “invasive” here is used with its dictionary meaning that is “something undesirable which spreads very quickly and which is very difficult to stop from spreading.”<sup>200</sup> While it seems desirable for a vulnerable group of society, it becomes unwelcome in the eyes of the establishment, since populist threat is reflected in its compelling and challenging expansion; as is the case with populism throughout the Americas, in Europe, and Asia today. Furthermore, it is considered as a political practice because it does not suggest an “ideological” content, a delimited “strategy,” or a determined “style of communication,” instead it manifests itself in different ideologies being able to recover elements of different conceptions of the realm, explores unlimited strategies molded to their own realities and background, and navigates in various styles of communication, to build an almost impenetrable bond with “the people,” and thus, with the support of this group, be able to come to power. In this conception, the ideologies, styles, and strategies become dimensions proper of this praxis. This means that it is through these elements that populism can be identified and differentiated from other ways of doing politics.

When it comes to making a populist connection, why is the term “sensitive factions of a society” used and not “the people” right away? It is well known that when speaking of populism, it is impossible to delimit it to a specific political faction. “The people” could not always be the poorest and most disregarded class that leftist politicians generally cling to, as it is in most Latin American cases. The center and right-wing parties and politicians also use this strategy of targeting other vulnerable groups in society, such as racial, religious, or anti-immigrant groups, among others. The common denominator factor is that the chosen group is almost always the most sensitive or “easily influenced...”<sup>201</sup> by the populist leader.

Considering that this research is aligned with the line of study that refers to the populist leader-people bond, it can be argued that populist systems have really invaded the historical spheres of our realm. This assault begins from the formation of this relationship between the populist leader and “the people.” A relationship that is formed from the expectations of “the people” which are based on the optimism of seeing their problems resolved as soon as possible. This eagerness on the part of “the people” to see their problems resolved makes them easy targets for this type of political practice, such as populism. These expectations leave “the people” open to generating a strong connection with the candidate who promises to solve their problems. It is there and within the narrative of political speeches, where populist candidates begin to feed those expectations, connect with “the people,” and gain support. Without making it clear

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<sup>199</sup> Planned or arranged in order to produce a particular effect.  
Source: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/calculated>

<sup>200</sup> Source: <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/invasive>

<sup>201</sup> Sensitive adjective (REACTING EASILY). Source: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/sensitive>

whether or not his/her intentions to meet people's expectations will be executed when he/she is finally elected.

Last but not least, comparative studies, like this one, have the potential to shed additional light to the leader-people bond in populist rhetoric as well as action. Cases from Europe or Asia may help to test further the reliability of the mechanisms designated in this research. More detailed explorations of the sociological or psychological perceptions on non-verbal communication are also welcomed. Since, even with what has been said so far about corporal language here, this category should be analyzed by other professional researchers that make this matter their main topic, and thus explain in detail how this mechanism regulates the leader-people bond. Other questions to consider for future research are: can the populist leader-people interaction build a theory of populist effectiveness? Can the populist leader-people connection produce a lasting effect on the political reality of a country? How does that connection manage to do that? Applied to this same or other case studies, and related to the discussion about whether or not all leaders exercise charisma, can a leader use charismatic techniques without being charismatic and still achieve a strong connection with his/her followers?

Regarding this research, it is expected to have clearly presented the mechanisms used in the populist narrative to develop a leader-people bond, and how this relationship can modify the sociopolitical context of a country. In turn, it is expected to have aroused inquisitiveness for future research on the subject.

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**APPENDIX 1. List of Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump Public Apparitions, Six Months Prior to 2012 and 2016 Presidential Elections Respectively**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Donal Trump</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Hugo Chávez</b>
4/4/2016	Speech - La Crosse	3/4/2012	Speech - La Habana, Cuba
—	Speech - Superior	3/11/2012	Speech - La Habana, Cuba
—	Speech with Mellania T. - Milwaukee	3/16/2012	Speech - Caracas Int. Airpot
4/6/2016	Speech - Bethpage	3/17/2012	Speech - Announcement of the candidacy - Vargas
4/10/2016	Speech - Rochester	3/20/2012	Speech - Arg, Vzla agreements - Caracas
4/11/2016	Speech - Albany	3/24/2012	Speech - Caracas
4/12/2016	Speech - Rome, NY	—	Speech - Health trip - Caracas Int. Airpot
4/13/2016	Speech - Pittsburg	3/27/2012	Speech - Social misions - La Habana, Cuba
4/14/2016	Spech - Suffolk County	3/29/2012	Speech - Mision Vivienda
—	Speech - New York	3/31/2012	Speech - MisionAgroVzla.
4/15/2016	Speech - Plattsburg	4/4/2012	Speech - Returning Vzla - Caracas Int. Airpot
4/18/2016	Speech - Buffalo	4/5/2012	Speech - Health regilious meeting - Barinas
4/19/2016	Speech - New York primaries	4/7/2012	Speech - Executive meeting - DC
4/20/2016	Speech - Indianapolis	4/11/2012	Speech - 10 years Chavism -DC
—	Speech - Berlin,MD	4/13/2012	Speech - April 2002 - DC
4/21/2016	Speech - Harrisburg	4/24/2012	Speech - Message to Nation - La Habana, Cuba
4/25/2016	Speech - Warwick	4/26/2012	Speech - Returning Vzla - Caracas Int. Airpot
—	Speech - West Chester	4/30/2012	Speech - New Labor Law - Caracas
—	Speech - Wilkes Barre	5/7/2012	Speech - Returning Vzla - Caracas Int. Airpot

4/26/2016	Speech - Primaries	5/22/2012	Speech - Consejo de Ministros - DC
4/27/2016	Speech - Foreing Policy -Washintong DC	5/29/2012	Speech - Consejo de Ministros - DC
—	Speech - Indianapolis	6/2/2012	Speech - DC
4/28/2016	Speech - Evansville	6/4/2012	Speech - Consejo de Ministros - DC
—	Speech - Costa Mesa	6/9/2012	Speech - Russian Min. Visit - DC
5/2/2016	Speech - Carmel	6/11/2012	Speech - Inscription of the candidacy - DC
—	Speech South Bend	6/13/2012	Speech - Fuerza Armada - DC
5/3/2016	Speech - Indianapolis primaries	6/15/2012	Speech - Venezuela economy - DC
5/5/2016	Speech - Omaha	6/20/2012	Speech - A todavidaMision - DC
—	Speech - Charleston	6/22/2012	Speech - Iran president Visit - DC
5/6/2016	Speech - Eugene	—	Speech - Iran, Vzla. meeting - DC
5/7/2016	Speech - Spokane	6/24/2012	Speech - 191 aniversario -DC
5/20/2016	Speech - NRA - Louisville	6/26/2012	Speech - DC
5/24/2016	Speech - Albuquerque	—	Speech - Presidential palace - DC
5/25/2016	Speech - Anaheim	—	Speech - Belarus agreemnts - DC
5/26/2016	Speech - American 1st Energy Plan - Bismarck	6/29/2012	Speech - Consejo de Ministros - DC
—	Speech - Billings	7/1/2012	Speech - Pres. Campaign Start - Aragua
5/27/2016	Speech - Fresno	7/3/2012	Speech - El valle, DC
—	Speech - San Diego	7/5/2012	Speech - legislative Palace, DC
6/1/2016	Speech - Sacramento	—	Speech - Independency - Los proceres, DC
6/2/2016	Speech - San Jose	7/6/2012	Speech - Sao Paulo forooclousure - DC
6/3/2016	Speech - Redding	7/8/2012	Speech - Fuertetiuna, DC

6/7/2016	Speech - Primaries - Westchester	7/9/2012	Speech - Candidacy - DC
6/10/2016	Speech - Faith and Freedom - DC	7/11/2012	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC
—	Speech - Richmond, VA	—	Speech with Alicia Kirchner, DC
6/11/2016	Speech - Moon Township	7/12/2012	Speech - Anzoategui
6/13/2016	Speech - Addressing Terrorism - Manchester, NH		Speech - Olympic Venezuelan athletes
6/14/2016	Speech - Greensboro	7/13/2012	Speech - Pto. La Cruz, Anzoategui
6/15/2016	Speech - Orlando shooting - Atlanta	7/14/2012	Speech - Fuerteventura, DC
6/17/2016	Speech - Houston	—	Speech - Barquisimeto, Lara
6/18/2016	Speech - Las Vegas	7/18/2012	Speech - San Juan, Guarico
—	Speech - Phoenix	7/21/2012	Speech - Maracaibo, Zulia
6/22/2016	Speech - The stakes of the election - NY	7/22/2012	Speech - Costa oriental, Zulia
6/28/2016	Speech - American economic independence, PA	7/23/2012	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC
6/29/2016	Speech - Bangor, ME	7/24/2012	Speech - Simon Bolivar - Miraflores palace, DC
6/30/2016	Speech - Manchester, NH	—	Speech - Pto. Cabello, Carabobo
7/1/2016	Speech - Summit -Denver	7/25/2012	Speech - Brasil, Vzla. - Miraflores palace, DC
7/5/2016	Speech with Bob Corker - Raleigh	7/26/2012	Speech - El valle, DC
7/6/2016	Speech with Eric Trump - Cincinnati	7/27/2012	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC
7/11/2016	American economic independence, PA	7/28/2012	Speech - Petare, Miranda
7/12/2016	Speech with Mike Pence - Westfield, IN	7/30/2012	Speech - Caracas Int. Airport
7/16/2016	Speech with Mike Pence - New York	—	Speech - Brasilia, Brasil (3)
7/18/2016	Speech - Rep. National Conv. - Cleveland	7/31/2012	Speech - Panalto, Brasil
7/19/2016	Speech - Rep. National Conv. - Cleveland	—	Speech - Mercosur meeting - Brasil
7/20/2016	Speech with Mike Pence - Cleveland	—	Speech - Venezuelan embassy,

			Brasil
7/21/2016	Speech - Rep. Nomination Acceptance - OH	8/1/2012	Speech - Returning Vzla - Caracas Int. Airpot
7/22/2016	Speech with Mike Pence - RNC vol - Cleveland	8/3/2012	Speech - Antimano, DC
7/25/2016	Speech with Mike Pence - Roanoke	8/5/2012	Speech - Valencia, Carabobo
7/26/2016	Speech with Mike Pence - Charlotte	8/6/2012	Speech - Ciudad Alianza, Carabobo
7/27/2016	Speech with Eric Trump - Scranton	8/7/2012	Speech - San Agustin, DC
7/28/2016	Speech - Davenport	—	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC
7/29/2016	Speech - Colorado Springs	8/8/2012	Speech - Plaza Venezuela, DC
—	Speech - Denver	8/9/2012	Speech - Catia, La guaira
8/1/2016	Speech - Columbus	—	Speech - Viviendas - La guaira
8/2/2016	Speech with Eric Trump - Ashburn	8/10/2012	Speech - El valle, DC
8/3/2016	Speech - Daytona Beach	—	Speech - Fuertetiuna, DC
8/4/2016	Speech - Portland, ME	8/11/2012	Speech - San Cristonal, Tachira
8/5/2016	Speech - Des Moines, IA	8/14/2012	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC
—	Speech - Green Bay	—	Speech - Consejo de Ministros - DC
8/8/2016	Speech - Detroit	8/15/2012	Speech - Teatro municipal, DC
8/9/2016	Speech - Wilmington	8/17/2012	Speech - San Agustin, DC
—	Speech - Fayetteville	8/18/2012	Speech - San Felix, Bolivar
8/10/2016	Speech - Abingdon	8/20/2012	Speech - Caroni, Bolivar
8/11/2016	Speech - Miami Beach	—	Speech - Caruachi, Bolivar
—	Speech - Kissimmee	8/21/2012	Speech - Faja del Orinoco, Monagas
8/12/2016	Speech - Eire	8/22/2012	Speech - Faja del Orinoco 2, Monagas
8/15/2016	Speech with Mike Pence - Understanding the threat - Youngstown, OH	—	Speech - Cumana Airport, Sucre

8/16/2016	Speech - West Bend	8/23/2012	Speech - Cumana, Sucre
8/18/2016	Speech - Charlotte	8/24/2012	Speech - Cumanacoa, Sucre
8/19/2016	Speech - Dimondale	8/27/2012	Speech - Punto Fijo, Falcon
8/20/2016	Speech - Fredericksburg	8/28/2012	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC
8/22/2016	Speech - Akron, OH	8/29/2012	Speech - Maiqueria, La guaira
8/23/2016	Speech with Mary Mendoza - Austin	9/4/2012	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC
8/24/2016	Speech - Tampa	9/5/2012	Speech -El calvario, DC
—	Speech with Nigel Farage - Jackson, MS	9/7/2012	Speech - Coche, DC
8/25/2016	Speech with Tiffany Trump - Manchester, NH	9/9/2012	Speech - Charallave, Miranda
8/27/2016	Speech with Michele Root - Des Moines	9/11/2012	Speech - San Agustin, DC
8/30/2016	Speech - Everett	9/12/2012	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC
8/31/2016	Speechwith Enrique Pena Nieto - Mexico DF	9/14/2012	Speech - Punta Gorda, Barinas
—	Speech - Immigration - Phoenix	9/15/2012	Speech - Sabaneta, Barinas
9/1/2016	Speech - American LNC	—	Speech - San Fernando, Apure
—	Speech - Wilmington	9/17/2012	Speech - Macarao, DC
9/3/2016	Speech with Wayne Jackson, Detroit	—	Speech - Catia, DC
9/6/2016	Speech with Ivanca and Lara Trump - Greenville	9/19/2012	Speech - El valle, DC
9/7/2016	Speech - New York	9/20/2012	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC
—	Speech - Philadelphia	9/21/2012	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC
9/8/2016	Speech -Cleveland	—	Speech - Merida, Merida
9/9/2016	Speech - Values Votters Summit -DC	9/22/2012	Speech - Valera, Trujillo
—	Speech - Pensacola, FL	9/24/2012	Speech - Acarigua, Portuguesa
9/12/2016	Speech - Nat. Guard Asso. - Baltimore	9/26/2012	Speech - Coro, Falcon
—	Speech - Asheville, NC	9/27/2012	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC

9/13/2016	Speech - Des Moines, IA	9/28/2012	Speech - Caracas, DC
—	Speech - Aston	—	Speech - Satellite - Caracas, DC
9/14/2016	Speech with F. Green Timmons - Flint, MI	—	Speech - Maturin, Monagas
—	Speech - Canton, OH	9/29/2012	Speech - Petare, Miranda
9/15/2016	Speech with Eric Trump - Laconia, NH	—	Speech - Guarenas, Miranda
—	Speech with John Paulson - New York	9/30/2012	Speech - Cabimas, Zulia
9/16/2016	Speech - Washington DC	10/1/2012	Speech - San Carlos, Cojedes
—	Speech - Miami	—	Speech - Sabaneta, Barinas
9/17/2016	Speech - Victimis of Illegal Immigration - Houston	10/2/2012	Speech - Barquisimeto, Lara
—	Speech - Colorado Springs	—	Speech - Yaritagua, Yaracuy
9/19/2016	Speech - Fort Meyers	10/3/2012	Speech - Valencia, Carabobo
9/20/2016	Speech - Kenansville	—	Speech - Maracay, Aragua
—	Speech - High Point, NC	10/4/2012	Speech - Campaign Closure - Caracas, DC
9/21/2016	Speech - Toledo, OH	—	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC
9/22/2016	Speech - Plan for American Energy - Pittsburg	10/6/2012	Speech - Miraflores palace, DC
9/24/2016	Speech - Roanoke, VA	10/7/2012	Victory Speech
9/26/2016	Debate #1		
9/27/2016	Speech - Melbourne, FL		
9/28/2016	Speech - Chicago		
—	Speech - Council Bluffs, IA		
—	Speech - Waukesha, WI		
9/29/2016	Speech - Bedford, NH		
9/30/2016	Speech - Novi, MI		
10/1/2016	Speech - Manheim, PA		

10/3/2016	Speech - Cybersecurity -Herndon, VA		
—	Speech - Am. Needs a comeback - Pueblo, CO		
—	Speech - Loveland, CO		
10/4/2016	Speech - Prescott Valey, AZ		
10/5/2016	Speech - America wealthy ag - Henderson, NV		
—	Speech - Reno		
10/7/2016	Speech - Apology		
10/9/2016	Debate #2		
10/10/2016	Speech - Ambridge, PA		
10/11/2016	Speech - Wikileaks - Panama City, FL		
10/12/2016	Speech - Ocala, FL		
—	Speech - Lakeland, FL		
10/13/2016	Speech - Make Am. Great again - Colombus		
—	Speech - West Palm Beach		
—	Speech - Cincinnati		
10/14/2016	Speech - Greensboro		
—	Speech - Charlotte		
10/15/2016	Speech - Opioids - Portsmouth, NH		
—	Speech - Jobs for americans - Bangor, ME		
10/17/2016	Speech - Reforms plans - Green Bay, WI		
10/18/2016	Speech - Colorado Springs		
—	Speech - Grand Junction, CO		
10/19/2016	Debate #3		
10/20/2016	Speech - American workers -		

	Delaware		
—	Speech - Charity dinner - NY		
10/21/2016	Speech - Fletcher		
—	Speech - Johnstown, PA		
—	Speech - American infrastructure - PA		
10/22/2016	Speech - 100st day at office - Gettysburg, PA		
—	Speech - Virginia Beach		
—	Speech - Cleveland		
10/23/2016	Speech - Naples, FL		
10/24/2016	Speech - St. Augustine, FL		
—	Speech - Tampa		
10/25/2016	Speech -Stanford, FL		
—	Speech - Tallahassee, FL		
—	Speech - Marietta, OH		
10/26/2016	Speech - DC		
—	Speech - Charlotte		
—	Speech - Kinston, NC		
10/27/2016	Speech - Springfield, OH		
—	Speech - Toledo, OH		
—	Speech - Geneva, OH		
10/28/2016	Speech - Manchester, NH		
—	Speech with Mike Flynn - Lisbon, ME		
—	Speech - Cedar Rapids, IA		
10/29/2016	Speech - Corruption - Golden, CO		
—	Speech - America great again - Phoenix		
10/30/2016	Speech - Jobs and Security - Las		

	Vegas		
—	Speech - Greeley		
10/31/2016	Speech - Grand Rapids		
—	Speech with Bob Knight - Warren, MI		
11/1/2016	Speech - Obamacare - Valley Forge, PA		
—	Speech - New leadership - Eau Claire, WI		
11/2/2016	Speech - Miami		
—	Speech - Orlando		
—	Speech - Pensacola, FL		
11/3/2016	Speech - Jacksonville, FL		
—	Speech - Concord, NC		
—	Speech - Rebuild Military - Selma, NC		
11/4/2016	Speech - Atkinson, NH		
—	Speech - Wilmington		
—	Speech with Barbara Rone - Hershey, PA		
11/5/2016	Speech - On Clintons		
—	Speech - New leadership - Tampa		
—	Speech - Wilmington, NC		
—	Speech - Reno, NV		
11/6/2016	Speech - Sioux City, IA		
—	Speech - Corrupt Political class - Minneapolis, MN		
—	Speech - Sterling Heights, MI		
—	Speech - Leesburg, VA		
11/7/2016	Speech - Sarasota, FL		

—	Speech - Raleigh, NC		
—	Speech - Scranton, PA		
—	Speech with Ivanka Trump - Manchester, NH		
—	Speech - Grand Rapids		
11/9/2016	Victory Speech		

## APPENDIX 2. Chávez's Major Themes in 2012 Campaign Electoral Speeches

### CHAVEZ:

- Repeated marks of him being "the people" in a very visible way.
- When he is addressing the country, with great deep catholic roots, is presenting himself as a kind of god, savior of the people. He pointed out passages from the bible, quoted christian proverbs, and compared himself to Jesus, etc. A god who owned all venezuelan lands and did according to his will.
- Charismatic-messianic leader, endowed with great scenic talents, whom the people venerated as a heroic and even divine figure.
- Refers to the poor several times as their savior, the one who listens and attends to their basic needs.
- Offers a "simple" speech for complex problems in Venezuela, and I mean by simple, easy to understand.
- Used a lot of venezuelan manners, emotional language, full of keys and with a strong-symbolic content, full of tones changes and emphasis. There are not flat and "boring" speeches on his records.
- His promises to the people are all over and he repeats them again and again, to rescue and to return to a golden age of independence that began with Simón Bolívar.
- Makes clear and constant distinction between the people and the bourgeoisie, that corrupt elite that sunk the people in poverty and is on the way to do it again. (Sometimes it sounds kind of resentment or anger to me) Is always pointing them. An antagonistic struggle by identifying an enemy, that horrible elite, the enemy #1 for the people. It's thanks to this enemy that Venezuela have all this economical and social issues, in the first place.
- He vindicates the people of Venezuela as the only group, despite he mentions several times the Venezuelan Bourgeoisie.
- It's evident that his speech is quite direct, anti-Yankee/North American, and its capitalist system.
- He constantly appeals to emotions such as love, hate, etc.
- Appeal to youth
- Create an intense family-affective relationship. By clarifying the common enemy, the enemy of the people the high bourgeoisie and the most powerful elites in the country, who seek at all cost to recover the wealth that belongs to the people.

### APPENDIX 3. Trump's Major Themes in 2016 Campaign Electoral Speeches

#### TRUMP:

- There's a group, which is obviously the American people, who hate him because he defends the identity of the real American people, the heritage and history of the "true" people, the "true" Americans.
- He include himself in the group of "real" people
- The media is included on the group of enemies, because they try to deceive the people. That is why he prefers to address the people directly.
- To defend the people he says that: rejecting - ending agreements with other countries is the solution.
- A strong speech to strengthen the army, so they can be better defend the people from the aggression of the enemy such as criminal immigrants, muslim terrorists, dictatorial regimes, etc.
- Repeatedly he victimizes the american people, including him.
- He stands as the only savior, and the only one who has cared for the american people of all his predecessors.
- Attacks his opponent directly, placing him within the group of enemies of the people.
- Appeals to the large and important communities of the country (Christians, LGBT, etc)
- Appeals the feelings of struggle, patriotism, and enhances the positive sentiment towards the war veterans through the discourse that he is going to fight for the people.